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Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment-Discrimination Law
in the Neoliberal Era
DEBORAH DINNER*
Why does U.S. legal culture tolerate unprecedented economic inequality even as it
valorizes social equality along identity lines? This Article takes a significant step
toward answering this question by examining the relationship between U.S.
employment-discrimination law and neoliberalism. It shows that the rise of antidiscrimination ideals in the late twentieth century was intertwined with the deregulation of labor and with cutbacks in the welfare state. The Article argues that
even “best practices” to prevent employment discrimination are insufficient to realize a labor market responsive to the needs of low-income workers for adequate
wages, safe work conditions, and work hours and schedules that allow for fulfilling
family and civic lives.
The legal scholarship on employment discrimination and the humanities scholarship on neoliberalism are ordinarily siloed. Placing these two literatures in conversation shows that the ideals underpinning Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
overlap with the major tenets of neoliberalism. Both affirm individual freedom, efficient markets, and judicially enforced negative rights.
The conceptual convergence between Title VII and neoliberalism enabled employers, business trade associations, courts, and even liberal scholars to interpret
the statute in ways that expanded managerial freedom and undermined workers’
economic security and control over the terms of their jobs. Drawing on novel historical research, this Article illustrates how this happened. In the early 1970s, employers
litigated under Title VII to invalidate state laws regulating the hours and conditions
of women’s work. Today, legal scholars commonly extol the end of these labor standards as marking the genesis of a contemporary prohibition on sex-role stereotypes.
In actuality, the erosion of state protective labor laws represented the defeat of
working-class feminists’ more capacious vision for sex equality. Through the 1970s
and 1980s, furthermore, scholars argued that Title VII promoted efficient labor markets. This normative justification, however, had the unintended effect of foreclosing
claims under the statute that sought not merely opportunity but also the transformation of labor-market structures.
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Failure to understand how neoliberalism and Title VII jurisprudence intersected
historically leaves us blind to the ways in which employment-discrimination law may
legitimate economic inequality. This has important consequences for contemporary
legal theory. Dominant antidiscrimination theories—centered on antistereotyping
and efficiency—reinforce the existing terms of the employment relationship and do
not serve the needs of working-class women and men. This Article reveals the limits
of antidiscrimination theory to remediate class-based subordination.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article brings new insight to bear on a puzzle in American legal and political
culture: why has economic inequality grown, even as the nation has taken significant
strides toward social equality? In the late twentieth century, the antidiscrimination
ideal gained legitimacy at the same time that economic inequality rose to an apex
unmatched in American history. Both the political Left and Right subscribe to ideals
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of formal equality, meritocracy, and individual freedom. Most Americans abhor discrimination on the basis of race and sex, at least in the abstract.1 Yet the United States
has among the largest disparities in income and wealth of all developed countries. 2
Sociologists and political theorists link these disparities to the ascendance of
neoliberal policies, including the deregulation of capital and labor markets and a retrenchment in the welfare state.3 In sum, while our legal and political culture aspires
to end discrimination on the basis of identity categories, we also tolerate deepening
subordination on the basis of class. This Article analyzes a more specific formulation
of the larger puzzle: what is the socio-legal function of employment discrimination
law in the neoliberal age?
To answer this question, we must begin by exploring a corresponding scholarly
dilemma. Voluminous bodies of scholarship examine antidiscrimination law, on one
hand, and neoliberalism, on the other. Antidiscrimination scholarship celebrates Title
VII for containing the promise of sex and race equality, even if the statute has not
yet fully realized that aspiration. Title VII, the scholarship argues, has the capacity
to help dismantle a socio-legal system that enforces ideas about race and sex difference. Scholarship in the humanities, meanwhile, decries neoliberalism as the constellation of ideologies, laws, and policies that has entrenched economic inequality.
Neoliberalism, this literature argues, has functioned as a “mode[] of governance”4 to
deregulate capital and labor markets, privatize former state functions, and cut welfare
entitlements. These two literatures on antidiscrimination law and neoliberalism,

1. Even formal equality for gays, lesbians, and transgender individuals, however, remains politically contested. See, e.g., Jonathan Capehart, Don’t Expect Gay Rights To Stay
Under GOP’s Radar for Long, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/dont-expect-gay-rights-to-stay-under-the-gops-radar-for-long/2016/01/08/0a95e8a0-b576
-11e5-9388-466021d971de_story.html [https://perma.cc/YS9D-P7AH] (describing pressures
within the GOP for presidential candidates to vocalize support for religious liberty over gay
rights); Chris Johnson, DNC Chair Expects 2016 Platform To Include Equality Act, WASH.
BLADE (Sept. 28, 2015, 2:02 PM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/09/28/dnc-chair
-expects-2016-platform-to-include-equality-act/ [https://perma.cc/8V5M-8W8E] (describing
probable Democratic Party support for adding sexual orientation to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Fair Housing Act). Likewise, the Right has not always supported formal equality.
Instead, over the course of several decades’ conflict and accommodation, conservatives came
to embrace equality while also contributing to a narrowing of its meaning. The defeat of the
Equal Rights Amendment, coupled with the achievement of formal equality under the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides a case in point. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto
ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006) (examining how social-movement mobilization and
countermobilization shaped the meaning of constitutional sex equality).
2. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CRISIS SQUEEZES INCOME AND PUTS
PRESSURE ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY 4 fig.4 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/els/soc
/OECD2013-Inequality-and-Poverty-8p.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK84-9QCG] (showing that the
United States has the fourth highest level of income inequality among thirty-four Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations).
3. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH
REVOLUTION 28 (2015); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 7–13 (2005).
4. Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 71, 83 (2014).
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however, are siloed from each other.5 The failure to put them in conversation hinders
scholars’ capacity to analyze the historical relationship between sex-discrimination
law and neoliberalism and as well as the normative consequences of this relationship
for gender and class inequities today. This Article is among the first to recognize that
antidiscrimination may function as a “master legal frame”6 to legitimate neoliberalism.
The Article analyzes how employment-discrimination law advanced neoliberalism in the late twentieth century and explains why this history matters. 7 It uses
historical examples to illuminate unexamined shortcomings in contemporary legal
scholarship and doctrine.8 The Article begins in Part I by reviewing dual scholarly
narratives: Title VII’s importance to sex equality and neoliberalism’s impact on class
inequities. Analyzing these narratives side-by-side offers new insight into the values
that underpin both Title VII and neoliberalism. These values include the ideal of
efficient markets, the notion that the fundamental subject of law is the individual
rather than the collective, and the primacy of negative rights enforced by the judiciary. The Article thus points to conceptual overlap between employment discrimination law and neoliberalism.
Part II considers how the historical implementation of Title VII via legal institutions, doctrine, and thought helped to catalyze and entrench a neoliberal labor market. To examine this dynamic, the Article focuses on legal contests in the late twentieth century about the meaning of sex equality in employment. I make two historical
claims. The first argument is that Title VII came to eclipse labor protection as the
leading framework for understanding legal sex equality. I argue, more provocatively,
that the rise of the antidiscrimination ideal and the decline of the protective ideal
were not merely coincidental; rather, the deployment of Title VII played a causal role

5. Recent scholarship has begun to examine the neoliberal dimensions of multiple legal
fields. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and
Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (2014); Amy
Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2014). To date,
however, no one has followed this line of inquiry into employment law.
6. Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes
and the Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC. 1718, 1727
(2006) (arguing that in the late 1960s the women’s movement shifted its legal framing from
protection to equality).
7. This Article is among the first to critique the neoliberal dimensions of antidiscrimination doctrine and theory. I draw on earlier work highlighting the failure of antidiscrimination
law to challenge structural inequality and exploitation within the employment relationship.
See Tucker Culbertson & Jack Jackson, Proper Objects, Different Subjects and Juridical
Horizons in Radical Legal Critique, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY 135, 145–51
(Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam P. Romero eds., 2009) (critiquing theories of sexual harassment advanced by Janet Halley and Vicki Schultz that fail to challenge
the exploitation of workers within neoliberal capitalism); Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond
Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713,
1736 (2012) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws based on identity are inadequate to remediate structural disadvantage that arises from social roles and functions).
8. The purpose of this Article is not to examine comprehensively the historical process
by which feminism and neoliberalism intertwined. I analyze these dynamics in broader scope
and greater detail elsewhere. See DEBORAH DINNER, CONTESTED LABOR: SOCIAL REPRODUCTION, WORK, AND LAW IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE, 1965–2010 (forthcoming 2018).
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in the decline of labor protection. Second, I argue that while inherently limited in its
capacity to promote economic equality along class lines, Title VII once held more
capacious meaning. Trends in scholarship and in doctrine through the 1970s, however, interpreted Title VII according to neoliberal principles and thereby narrowed
its scope. I conclude that neoliberalism left its imprint on Title VII both in the design
and the implementation of the statute.
Rather than providing a comprehensive historical narrative, I analyze two illustrative moments that were pivotal to constructing the meaning of sex equality. The
first was the end of maternalist labor laws in the early 1970s. I challenge the scholarship that celebrates these laws’ demise as the genesis of contemporary sex equality
doctrine. Instead, I highlight labor feminists’ understanding that sex equality required
state action to mitigate capitalism’s excesses. These feminists, who used unions to
fight for women’s rights, argued for protective labor standards as well as equal employment opportunity.9 As the concept of antistereotyping came to replace that of
labor protection, this ideal got lost. As a result, antidiscrimination law protected
women’s rights to equal employment opportunity in a labor market characterized by
the absence of protective regulation.
The second turning point was the framing of Title VII as an efficiency-promoting
statute. This impulse manifested in the scholarship on race discrimination, which
sought to ground the normative justification for Title VII in part on market values.
But doing so made disparate-impact liability appear increasingly problematic and
thereby foreclosed gender-discrimination claims that sought not merely to increase
opportunity but rather to transform labor-market structures.
In Part III, the Article analyzes the consequences of this history for contemporary
understandings of equality. Today, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and scholars advocate institutional “best practices” to prevent discrimination. Such best practices involve prohibitions on gender and racial stereotypes and
reinforce the idea that employment-discrimination law promotes efficient labor markets. I argue, however, that these best practices are incapable of redressing the structural inequalities facing low-income workers. The dominance of antistereotyping
theory relinquishes challenges to the fundamental terms of the employment relationship and gives up claims that the state has a responsibility to regulate those terms. In
addition, efficiency continues to act as a prominent rationale cabining the scope of
employment-discrimination law. As a consequence, antidiscrimination doctrine and
theory limit the kinds of disparate-impact litigation that would not only promote gender inclusion within the workplace but also redistribute power between employers
and workers. I show that the failure to recognize the imbrication of employment discrimination law with neoliberalism obscures the interests of working-class women
in debate about work-family conflict and legitimates class inequalities.
By opening a new window into the history of sex-discrimination law, this Article
raises a host of important questions about the limitations of contemporary antidiscrimination theory. It is a common observation that current legal doctrines and
institutions have not realized full inclusion and equal opportunity for women and
racial and sexual minorities. Antidiscrimination law’s limits, however, run deeper.
Employers, business trade associations, courts, and scholars have in specific

9. DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 4 (2004).
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instances deployed Title VII in ways that legitimated the status quo distribution of
power between workers and employers as well as a minimal welfare state. I conclude
by calling for greater attention to class as well as to sex to promote a labor market
that offers adequate income as well as benefits and schedules that enable low-income
workers to realize economic security, to gain greater control over the terms of their
jobs, and to maintain fulfilling lives outside of work.
I. THE PUZZLE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE
To understand Title VII and neoliberalism as normatively related rather than oppositional might be viewed as heretical. Almost without exception, the literature
celebrates Title VII’s aspiration to disrupt gender and race hierarchies even as it
recognizes the statute’s limitations in realizing this goal. Conversely, political
theorists and historians lament that neoliberal governance has deepened economic
inequality; legal scholars are beginning to join this chorus. Yet Title VII shares ideological underpinnings with the primary tenets of neoliberalism—an insight the
scholarship has not yet recognized.
A. Title VII: A Celebration
The dominant narrative lauds Title VII for enabling the women’s movement’s
efforts to combat employer practices and state laws that coerced the sexes into fixed
gender roles. In campaigning for administrative rules that would “take seriously” the
statute’s prohibition on sex discrimination, feminist activists challenged essentialist
understandings of women’s nature, capacities, and interests. In litigating under Title
VII, they combatted the gendered assumptions underpinning sex segregation in the
labor market.10
Antidiscrimination scholars argue that Title VII’s potential to topple gender hierarchy lies in its prohibition on sex-role stereotyping.11 The antistereotyping principle
takes aim at the family-wage system: the cultural ideologies, institutional practices,
and laws that reinforced the model of a family comprised of a male breadwinner and
dependent female caregivers.12 This principle suggests that laws and employer practices that reinforce the assumption that men are primarily workers and women are
primarily caregivers violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VII, respectively. 13 Antistereotyping theory, therefore, offers
the promise of ending state action and employer practices that coerce men and

10. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995,
1012–13 (2015).
11. See infra notes 24042, 24856, and accompanying text.
12. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY 7, 4244, 166 (2001). The familywage system was grounded in separate-spheres ideology, which emerged in the midnineteenth century in response to the social disruption caused by industrialization. The idea
that women would preserve domestic, nonmarket values and virtues in the home offered a
salve against competitive capitalism. See NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD, at xi,
xiv–xxiii (2d ed. 1997) (describing the historiography on “separate spheres”).
13. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 83 (2010); Schultz, supra note 10, at 100001.

2017]

BEY O ND “BES T PRA C T ICES ”

1065

women into rigid gender roles. It bears the hope that people will more freely express
identities in the workplace and realize a more humane balance between work and
family. Both men and women should have greater choice and opportunity regarding
whether and how to engage the rewards as well as the burdens of paid labor in the
market and unpaid caregiving labor in the home.
Antistereotyping theory affirms the individualism at the core of legal liberalism.
The prohibition on unlawful stereotyping targets the gap between an individual’s true
capacities and identity and the capacities attributed to her by a sex-respecting rule.
The scholarship identifying the harms of stereotyping stresses this point. Anita
Bernstein argues that “stereotyping is wrong to the extent that it functions to deprive
individuals of their freedom without good cause.”14 Meredith Render explains that
courts strike down certain gender stereotypes not because of the generalization itself,
but rather because of a determination that the generalization is unfair. 15 When law
embodies gender stereotypes, it regulates behaviors in ways that make certain gender
rules appear natural and fixed.16 This dynamic produces “social rules” that limit individual autonomy.17
If sex segregation and the constraint on individual flourishing represents the classic injuries under Title VII, then “openness” emerges as a key trope in the scholarship
valorizing the statute’s remedial hope. Legal scholar Vicki Schultz celebrates the
transformation in the American workplace wrought by Title VII, with reference to
her daughter’s “inherit[ance of] a world that is . . . more open”18 than that experienced
by her mother or grandmother.19 Historian Nancy MacLean subtitles her important
narrative about grassroots mobilization by women and people of color to enforce
Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate, The Opening of the American Workplace.20
The dominant narrative suggests that Title VII opens the labor market to women
seeking economic opportunity and social freedom.
Access to greater job opportunity in turn offers women enhanced material security
and economic independence. Ending sex segregation enables working-class women
to move from a pink-collar ghetto to better paid industrial jobs.21 It fosters professional women’s entrance into the ranks of higher management. As equal competitors
in the labor market, women can assume the role of primary breadwinners rather than
marginal workers. The enhanced economic autonomy makes them less dependent on

14. Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 659 (2013).
Stereotypes, Bernstein explains, serve as a technology for spreading prejudice. Id. at 677. They
enable the human brain to classify information about people and the world around them and
then to index these classifications in the memory. This cognitive process in turn enables the
brain to draw inferences about the stereotyped individual more quickly than one does ordinary
negative generalizations. See id. at 677.
15. Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 162–63 (2010).
16. Id. at 163–69.
17. Id. at 169–72.
18. Schultz, supra note 10, at 1007.
19. Id. at 1006–07.
20. NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (2006).
21. See SHARON H. MASTRACCI, BREAKING OUT OF THE PINK-COLLAR GHETTO 66 (2004).
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men and affords them greater freedom in choosing whether to enter or exit
marriage.22
The celebration of Title VII is not uniform and several critical voices explore the
limitations of the statute in realizing sex equality. With few exceptions, 23 however,
the critical strain of scholarship on Title VII locates its limitations either in judicial
interpretation24 or the statute’s implementation within workplaces.25 Scholars stop
short of arguing robustly that Title VII itself may function within American legal
culture to legitimate economic inequalities that disproportionately burden lowincome women workers.
B. Neoliberalism: A Lament
Neoliberalism is neither a coherent set of political policies nor a well-defined set
of philosophical ideals.26 It is “not conceptually neat.”27 Rather, David Harvey, one
of neoliberalism’s most prominent critics, argues that a fundamental premise organizes this practice: “that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.” 28 Social,
political, and legal actors mobilize this premise “defensively” to preserve market relations, “affirmatively” to support the rollout of market policies, and “ideologically”
to legitimate legal systems.29
The defining feature of neoliberalism is the hegemony of the free-market ideal,
which constitutes the “common sense” of our era.30 The free-market ideal underpins
deregulatory economic policies and also sets forth a theory of the societal good.
Neoliberalism stands for the proposition that the aggregate (not the collective) welfare is best realized through market transactions. 31 Individual contracting in the

22. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 71 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1098–
99 (2009) (arguing that employment discrimination law has proven ineffectual in challenging
the taken-for-granted workplace norms that produce gender inequality).
24. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 10, at 106668 (examining the “lack of interest” defense
and pregnancy-discrimination cases and concluding that the courts failed to interpret Title VII
broadly as a robust prohibition on sex stereotyping).
25. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 479–80 (2001) (arguing that courts are ill suited to address
more subtle, nuanced, and contextually variable discriminatory practices, today, than the explicit sex and race-based bias and animus of the past).
26. Blalock, supra note 4, at 84.
27. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2014).
28. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 2.
29. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 5.
30. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 3. The definition of hegemony is that the perspectives and
attitudes of the elite classes become the cultural consensus of the broader society. See generally 1 ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Joseph A. Buttigieg ed., Joseph A Buttigieg &
Antonio Callari trans., Columbia University Press 1992) (1975) (describing the common assumptions and beliefs that organize society).
31. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 3.
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market, moreover, is the site of individual expression and private choice. 32 If one
takes both these conclusions as true—that the market facilitates wealth maximization
and personal freedom—then neoliberalism not only maximizes wealth but also
promotes “the most decent society.”33
Neoliberalism, as political theorist Wendy Brown demonstrates, remodels all
spheres of society on the model of the market. 34 Neoliberalism represents a “political
rationality” that produces the “economization” of social life. 35 The citizen is conceived of as homo oeconomicus, an individual whose value to the polity is measured
by the extent to which she or he can maximize his or her human capital.36 Neoliberal
ideologies thereby transform citizens from democratic subjects and actors into individual wealth maximizers.37
Neoliberalism’s celebration of individual agency in the market relates closely to
its second premise: the assault on collectivity and solidarity as democratic ideals.
The ideal of the freely contracting consumer-citizen is in tension with social-justice
projects, which require the subordination of individual interests in service of collective goods. Neoliberalism’s tendency is thus to sever social movements that celebrate
individual difference and expression, in both labor and consumer markets, from mobilization to realize nonmarket values. Accordingly, neoliberalism “split[s] off libertarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumerism” from social mobilization for labor power, state protection, and socioeconomic
security.38 In particular, neoliberalism opposes the collective organization of workers
through unions that hold the power to circumscribe freedom and flexibility of
capital.39
The third tenet of neoliberalism is the ideological commitment to a minimal state
and to rollbacks in social services.40 Neoliberalism’s intellectual architect, Friedrich
Hayek, believed that the market was so complex that it lay beyond the reach of human understanding.41 Accordingly, Hayek argued, government should not intervene
in the market because politicians and administrators would be unable to predict the
consequences of their interventions.42 David Grewal and Jedediah Purdy write that a

32. Id. at 64.
33. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 6.
34. See BROWN, supra note 3, at 17. Harvey argues that neoliberalism represented an ideology that big business imposed on the state to serve its own interests. HARVEY, supra note 3,
at 13–15. Brown, however, contests this view. She argues that the free-market ideal is not
merely a disguise for particular business interests. BROWN, supra note 3, at 64; see also Terry
Flew, Michel Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics and Contemporary Neo-liberalism Debates,
108 THESIS ELEVEN 44, 46–47 (2012) (observing that there are two dominant theoretical interpretations of neoliberalism as a historical force in the second half of the twentieth century:
a Marxist interpretation and an interpretation that synthesizes Marxism with Michel Foucault’s
theory of governmentality).
35. BROWN, supra note 3, at 61–62.
36. Id. at 33–34.
37. Id. at 109.
38. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 41.
39. Id. at 75–76.
40. Id. at 76.
41. Blalock, supra note 4, at 85–86.
42. Blalock, supra note 4, at 86.
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sense of pessimism regarding even the capacity for state action to discipline the market pervades neoliberal political culture.43 Taken to its logical conclusion, the
neoliberal state would have almost no responsibility toward the socioeconomic security of its citizenry, beyond what is necessary to enable market function and quell
external political threats and internal social unrest that undermines market function.44
In his famous 1978–1979 lectures at the College de France, Michel Foucault observed that in the 1970s “the market . . . bec[a]me a new limit on the state even as it
began to saturate and construe the state with its distinctive form of reason.”45 As
political theorist Corinne Blalock argues, neoliberalism ideologically forecloses the
very possibility of state economic regulation in service of the public good. 46 The
liberalism exemplified by the New Deal in the United States and social democracy
in Europe sets constraints on the market, construing a primary function of governance to be mitigation of the harshest effects of capitalism. By contrast, neoliberalism
envisions the purpose of the state as promoting economic growth by enabling free
markets and competition.47
The ideologies of the minimal welfare state and the free market transform the
state’s response to inequality. These ideologies shift the basis of legitimacy for state
action from democratic authority to an assessment of whether a proposed law would
enable individual agency in the market. 48 Furthermore, neoliberalism’s conceptualization of the market undermines the demand for a state responsive to economic inequality. In contrast to classical economic liberalism, which focuses on mechanisms
of exchange in the marketplace, neoliberalism focuses on market competition. As
Wendy Brown explains, “equivalence is both the premise and the norm of exchange,
while inequality is the premise and outcome of competition.” 49 In constructing justice
as the realization of each individual’s capacity to exercise free choice in the market,
neoliberalism limits state responsibility for redressing economic inequality. 50 As
Grewal and Purdy caution, however, it would be too simplistic to label neoliberalism
“antiregulatory.”51 The central inquiry should be which forms of regulation
neoliberalism has enabled and which it has foreclosed, and in whose interests.

43. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 6.
44. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 153 (“The only fear [the upper classes] have is of political
movements that threaten them with expropriation or revolutionary violence. . . . [T]hey can
hope that the sophisticated military apparatus they now possess . . . will protect their wealth
and power . . . .”); see also id. at 15282.
45. BROWN, supra note 3, at 58.
46. See Blalock, supra note 4, at 8586.
47. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 6465; see Flew, supra note 34, at 5758.
48. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 3–4.
49. BROWN, supra note 3, at 64.
50. Blalock, supra note 4, at 93.
51. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 12–14. Contradictions exist between the ideal of a
minimal state and the practice of neoliberalism. Harvey identifies several: that between the
prohibition on state intervention in markets and active state policies that facilitate corporate
power; that between individual freedom and the authoritarian discipline necessary to impose
market discipline; and that between the aspiration toward the integrity of finance and the speculative activities of the financial sector. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 7980. Grewal and Purdy
additionally highlight those contradictions elucidated by the German sociologist Wolfgang
Streeck. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 2021. A tension exists in what Streeck calls

2017]

BEY O ND “BES T PRA C T ICES ”

1069

C. Putting Together the Puzzle Pieces
The passage of Title VII did not presuppose neoliberalism; neoliberal policies
were not a precondition for the emergence of employment discrimination law. The
enactment of Title VII represented the fulfillment of multiple political movements
and aspirations—most significantly, the movement for civil rights for African
Americans.52 Nonetheless, the potential existed for Title VII to facilitate
neoliberalism. Because Title VII and neoliberalism are both rooted in the American
liberal tradition, they share common, animating values.53 These values include individualism, efficiency, and negative rights.
First, employment-discrimination law shares with neoliberalism an emphasis on
individual self-determination and flourishing. Neoliberalism defines inequality as a
problem of artificial constraints on individual agency.54 Employment-discrimination
theory, and the antistereotyping principle in particular, similarly focus on injury to
individual potential.55 This focus sidesteps questions of structural disadvantage.
Neoliberal philosophies suggest that the purpose of government is to promote freedom of opportunity rather than to create more just economic structures. Employmentdiscrimination law likewise promotes inclusion of those excluded from labor-market
opportunity,56 but falls short of reconceptualizing the fundamental terms of the employment relationship. The metaphor of “opening” signals opportunity and access,
but not transformation.
Second, the hegemony of the market ideal is evident in both neoliberal ideology
and scholarly and judicial interpretations of Title VII. Efficiency has emerged as a
rationale both justifying and limiting interpretations of sex discrimination. Although

“democratic capitalism” between policies that encourage mass political participation and those
that foster liberty of capital. Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW
LEFT REV. 5, 7–8 (2011). If a state capitulates too far in the direction of democratic claims for
redistribution, it will upset economic elites; if it compensates the owners of capital in amounts
that outrage the public, then it risks populist unrest. See id.
52. MACLEAN, supra note 20, at 51–75 (describing the social movement mobilization and
counter-mobilization leading to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
53. However, Wendy Brown argues that neoliberalism represents a fundamental departure from traditional liberalism. See WENDY BROWN, EDGEWORK 38–39, 44–46 (2005) (arguing that the current erosion of democratic institutions signals a historical disjuncture). Despite
the discontinuities of neoliberal political culture with the past, however, neoliberal ideals
emerged from the wellspring of liberal thought.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 231–35, 238–52.
56. Certainly, Title VII promotes the inclusion of previously excluded groups (e.g., racial
minorities and women) and not individuals universally. But the disparate-treatment theory of
liability, at the core of the statute, operationalizes this inclusion largely via an analysis of discrimination against individuals. Compare McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802–04 (1973) (setting forth a burden-shifting framework by which a plaintiff may prove an
individual case of disparate-treatment liability), with Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (discussing the government’s burden in proving a “pattern or practice” under section 707(a) of Title VII). Moreover, the inclusion of those individuals within
excluded groups who can meet the demands posed by existing labor-market structures falls far
short of transforming those structures.
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not all scholars argue that efficiency provides the normative underpinning for employment discrimination law, it is a predominant rationale within the case law.57 The
judicial construction of Title VII as a statute meant to promote market rationality 58
helps to explain why courts routinely foreclose certain kinds of disparate-impact
claims under Title VII.
Third, Title VII doctrine, as it has evolved in the crucible of particular legal and
political contexts, has functioned at specific moments to legitimate neoliberalism’s
assault on the welfare state. Neoliberal ideology affirms the ideal of a minimal state,
even as it aggrandizes some elements of the state while weakening others. 59 The enactment of Title VII reinforced the courts’ role as engines of state building, but it has
also undermined the ideal of positive entitlements to social welfare as guaranteed by
legislatures and administrative agencies.60
To say that neoliberalism and antidiscrimination law share values is not to argue
that Title VII necessarily served neoliberal purposes. Such an argument would ignore
historical contingency. The shared liberal values, however, did create the necessary
condition for the historical possibility that Title VII would be construed and used in
a manner that comported with neoliberal purposes. The overlap in the principles
underpinning antidiscrimination law and neoliberalism enabled employers, courts,
and scholars to frame Title VII to advance free-market ideologies, even though it did
not predetermine that this would happen. Metaphorically speaking, the chemical
compounds existed for a reaction to take place, but external events were necessary
to catalyze the reaction.
Understanding how Title VII and neoliberalism intertwined historically requires
empirical analysis into the dynamic political and institutional contexts in which
employment-discrimination law evolved. A host of questions require further investigation: How did legal institutions facilitate or block the convergence between antidiscrimination doctrine and neoliberal policies? In what ways did employers and
business trade associations deploy Title VII? Did their actions facilitate or frustrate
social movement mobilization to enforce Title VII? This Article initiates an inquiry
into these questions and ultimately suggests that answering them should be critical
to future research agendas in legal history, feminist theory, and employment law.
II. NEOLIBERAL SEX EQUALITY: HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS
The influential political theorist Nancy Fraser argues that feminism in the late
twentieth century entered into a “romance” with neoliberalism. 61 Feminists turned
away from critiques of political economy and toward analyses of culture, she argues,
at precisely the moment neoliberal theories of governance took hold.62 Fraser speculates this could possibly be a tragic historical irony. Yet she queries whether “some

57. See infra text accompanying notes 267–68.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 27374.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 46–49.
60. See infra Part II.A.2.
61. Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History, 56 NEW LEFT REV.
97, 99, 108–09 (2009).
62. Id. at 108–09.
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perverse, subterranean elective affinity” existed between neoliberalism and feminism.63 Feminists, for example, valorized workforce participation as a site of social
equality. This ideal provided moral legitimacy for capitalist transformations that
drew women into the labor market, made long hours pervasive, and reduced the real
value of wages.64 Furthermore, feminists relinquished their earlier commitment to
deconstructing ideological boundaries between production in the market and social
reproduction, or the caregiving and other forms of labor needed to reproduce the next
generation.65 Fraser’s claim is startling and provocative.66 Is it historically accurate?
We do not yet have the historical knowledge that would enable us to understand
fully the process by which feminist mobilization and antifeminist countermobilization yielded neoliberal conceptions of sex equality. Part of the problem is
that many historians portray feminist and antifeminist activism as limited to the “culture wars.”67 According to this historical narrative, feminists fought to destabilize
conventional gender roles, while social conservatives fought to reinforce them. That
is only half the story, however. Labor feminists and grassroots community activists
fought not only for equal employment opportunity and sexual liberation but also for
affirmative state regulation that would produce a more just employment relationship.68 The most vocal and powerful opponents of this strain of feminist activism
were not social conservatives but rather employers and business trade associations.69
Legal scholarship is similarly limited by a focus on gender roles as opposed to
broader capitalist structures. The legal literature depicts the battle over sex equality
to have been fought on the terrain of sex-role stereotypes and antidiscrimination law
rather than on that of economic justice and labor law. The legal scholarship emphasizes the development of an antistereostyping principle, which challenged state laws
and employer practices that reinforced the male-breadwinner, female-caregiver
dyad.70 Ruth Bader Ginsburg emerges as the primary heroine of this story, and her

63. Id. at 108.
64. Id. at 110–11.
65. See id. at 104–05 (discussing how socialist-feminists “uncovered the deep-structural
connections between women’s responsibility for the lion’s share of unpaid caregiving” and
androcentrism).
66. Fraser also argued that politicians appropriated feminists’ critique of patriarchal welfare systems to end federal entitlement to public assistance. Id. at 111. This Article, however,
does not take up her argument regarding welfare.
67. See, e.g., DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 174 (2011).
68. See KATHERINE TURK, EQUALITY ON TRIAL 9 (2016) (“Beyond opening full economic
citizenship to laboring women, [working-class women] sought to use Title VII to reset the
terms of economic citizenship from laboring women’s perspective.”); Deborah Dinner, The
Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 415 (2011) (analyzing feminists’ pursuit of redistributive claims related to pregnancy, childcare, and family leave).
69. See DINNER, supra note 8.
70. Franklin, supra note 13, at 88. The ideals that animated the antistereotyping principle
had a longer liberal genealogy. They first found expression in John Stuart Mill’s foundational
1869 essay, The Subjection of Women. Id. at 93. Mill argued that the enforcement of women’s
dependence within the family rested on specious biological determinism. Id. at 95. Early twentieth century social thought elaborated on the distinction Mill drew between individual capacity and the social norms that regulated behavior. In the mid-twentieth century, social scientists
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achievements as counsel to the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) Women’s
Rights Project constitute its central drama.71 The legal and social history, in turn,
yields a specific normative commitment within contemporary feminist legal
theory—one that celebrates the potential of the antistereotyping principle.72
But the prevailing narrative is only a partial history, and its lack of attention to the
full range of feminist activism has narrowed the scope of feminist legal theory today.
Part II.A shows that labor feminists understood sex equality to require not only equal
employment opportunity but also the expansion of labor protections. Yet employers
deployed Title VII in ways that undermined protective standards and, over the course
of the 1970s, employment-discrimination law came to serve business’s interests in a
deregulated labor market. In addition, as Part II.B discusses, scholars and courts resorted to market logic as the normative basis for Title VII. They defined the statute’s
primary function to be the promotion of efficient labor markets, thereby narrowing
the capacity for Title VII jurisprudence to make workplace structures more hospitable to employees’ performance of reproductive labor outside of work.
A. The Erosion of Maternalist State Labor Standards
The historical and legal literature heralds the end of maternalist labor laws as the
dawn of a new era of sex equality.73 The scholarship chronicles the challenges that

applied the idea of the stereotype to analyze gender roles. Joanne Meyerowitz, A History of
“Gender,” 113 AM. HIST. REV. 1346, 1353–54 (2008). They distinguished between biological
sex difference and the cultural values, social practices, and institutional structures that comprised gender. Id. at 1354. Feminists in the late 1960s and early 1970s used these theories to
contest the idea that an inherent connection existed between the fact of a woman’s sex and
motherhood. Id. at 135455.
71. Ginsburg was influenced by both the broader women’s movement and her experiences
in Sweden, where state policy encouraged both women’s workforce participation and men’s
responsibility for familial caregiving. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 97–114. Ginsburg viewed
the legal regulation of pregnancy as the paradigm case of unconstitutional sex stereotyping.
Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to
Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1095, 1100 (2009); see also id. at 1099–106. Ginsburg’s litigation
strategy ultimately made significant dents in a constitutional and legal regime that channeled
women into a dependent, maternal role. Yet the Supreme Court and lower federal courts resisted applying the principle to the legal regulation of pregnancy. Franklin, supra note 13, at
157–63.
72. See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 144953
(2000) (arguing that the fulfillment of the antistereotyping principle will take the law in “interesting and radical directions”).
73. But see TURK, supra note 68, at 16, 22–25 (arguing that in the late 1960s the EEOC
crafted industry-specific solutions to the conflict between Title VII and state protective laws
which accommodated labor feminists’ claims to “equality with protection”). The dominant
scholarly treatment of the end of maternalist labor laws starkly contrasts with the literature on
the relationship between labor and the civil rights movement. That literature takes seriously
the question of whether antidiscrimination law undermined labor organization. See, e.g., PAUL
FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE 23, 5–7 (2008) (arguing that the creation of a new, distinct legal
regime to redress race discrimination “institutionalized the labor-race divide” because even as
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individual plaintiffs posed to sex-based state labor laws that excluded women from
higher-paying, industrial jobs.74 This celebratory narrative stems from the literature’s
focus on the development of an antistereotyping principle: if the legal regulation of
women on the basis of gender stereotypes constitutes the primary injury, then the
elimination of such laws represents the fulfillment of feminist activism. Nancy
MacLean presents the most powerful argument that “Title VII cut the Gordian knot”
that had divided the women’s rights movement into advocates of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) and advocates of protective laws.75 MacLean argues that because
Title VII “promis[ed] substantive fairness,” women no longer had to choose between
security and equal employment opportunity. 76 The legal literature likewise tends to
dismiss the “protectionist” frame within the movement as anachronistic. 77
This narrative has three shortcomings, all of which limit its capacity to recognize
and to explain how feminist advocacy and neoliberalism intertwined. First, because
the narrative represents advocates for maternalist labor laws as marginal figures who
embraced outdated gender stereotypes, it downplays these feminists’ argument that
legal protections for workers collectively (and not just individualist antidiscrimination claims) were necessary for a just labor market. The narrative likewise
ignores labor feminists’ struggle to universalize protective labor laws. Second, the
prevailing narrative overlooks the way in which employers used Title VII as a deregulatory tool to advance managerial prerogatives. Third, and relatedly, this narrative fails to recognize the limited capacity of employment-discrimination law to advance the economic security and social welfare of working-class women in a minimal
welfare state.

courts promoted civil rights, they drained the financial resources of unions defending antidiscrimination lawsuits); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION 19192 (rev. and
expanded ed. 2013) (arguing that the passage of Title VII reinforced a shift from concern with
economic inequality, capitalism, and the democratization of the workplace to emphasizing
legislation and statecraft that remedied the racial, and later the gender, divide within capitalism); REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS 79 (2015) (examining a tension within postwar liberalism between commitments to economic and racial egalitarianism and contrasting labor
law’s grounding in principles of majoritarianism and private ordering with employment discrimination law’s grounding in principles of countermajoritarianism).
Comparing the triumphant narrative about Title VII and sex equality with the more
skeptical narrative about Title VII, race, and labor reveals two gaps in the literature. The
juxtaposition highlights the absence of gender in the literature on the ambivalent consequences
of antidiscrimination law for the labor movement. This literature focuses almost exclusively
on race. Women make only cameo appearances in these accounts. Conversely the literature on
feminist advocacy and Title VII largely ignores the labor movement. As a consequence, this
literature takes insufficient account of the consequences the evisceration of the maternalist
labor regime posed for unions and for labor regulation.
74. See MACLEAN supra note 20, at 11754 (describing the mobilization of working-class
women to enforce Title VII’s promise of equal employment opportunity for women); ROBERT
O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY 10333 (2012).
75. MACLEAN, supra note 20, at 118.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 10, at 102425.
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1. Business Groups’ Defeat of the Voluntary-Overtime Law
The passage of Title VII reinvigorated a longstanding debate within the women’s
movement about maternalist labor standards.78 A half century earlier, in the
Progressive Era, social-feminist advocates and their allies had argued for the importance of labor protection. They used gender ideologies to circumvent the freedom
of contract doctrines deployed by Lochner-era courts.79 They argued that specific
laws were needed to protect working mothers from exploitation because of women’s
particular vulnerability as nonunionized, low-wage workers as well as their social
role as mothers.80 Advocates for maternalist labor standards hoped, furthermore, that
laws regulating women’s labor might one day yield universal state labor standards.
Advocates hoped to win protective laws for women first and then to use these to
legitimate the idea of labor protections and, subsequently, obtain the extension of
such laws to men.81
Through the 1920s and 1930s, maternalist labor laws became a major point of
contention between social feminists and ERA advocates. Social feminists argued that
maternalist labor laws regulating the hours and conditions of women’s work were
especially important given the system of federalism in the United States. The Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 largely excluded working-class women, overwhelmingly employed in service-sector jobs understood to be located within intrarather than interstate commerce.82 The National Woman’s Party, the major advocacy

78. In December 1965, the EEOC issued guidelines stating that Title VII did not preempt
state labor regulations that had the purpose and effect of “protecting women against exploitation and hazard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1966). Some feminists reacted angrily to the agency’s
sanctioning of laws that blocked women’s equal employment opportunity. Frustration with the
EEOC’s perceived reluctance to enforce the sex provision of Title VII led to the formation of
the National Organization for Women (NOW) in June 1966. RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT
OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA 7475 (2000). National
Councils of Catholic, Negro, and Jewish Women wrote to EEOC Chairman, Franklin
Roosevelt Jr., and Acting Chairman, Luther Holcomb, defending the guidelines. Letter from
Dorothy I. Height, Nat’l President, Nat’l Council of Negro Women, Inc., to Luther Holcomb,
Acting Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (July 28, 1966) (on file with author);
Letter from Olya Margolin, Wash. Representative, Nat’l Council of Jewish Women, to
Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (July 30, 1965) (on
file with author) (writing on behalf of multiple organizations including the National Council
of Catholic Women, the National Council of Jewish Women, and the National Council of
Negro Women).
79. See VIVIEN HART, BOUND BY OUR CONSTITUTION 63129 (1994).
80. Id. at 84–86, 90–106.
81. See id. at 63129; see also Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The
Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital, 1905–1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188, 199 n.15 (1991) (arguing that social feminists
sought first to win sex-specific protective labor laws and then to use these as a wedge to expand
protective standards to men).
82. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 2(a), 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012)); Suzanne B. Mettler, Federalism, Gender, & the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 26 POLITY 635, 64447 (1994) (discussing constructions of interstate commerce at the time of the FLSA’s passage).

2017]

BEY O ND “BES T PRA C T ICES ”

1075

organization for the ERA, however, came to view sex-specific labor standards as
inconsistent with the principle of sex equality under law. ERA advocates argued that
maternalist protections denied women job opportunities and reinforced gender roles
that relegated women to the domestic sphere.83
In the late 1960s, the debate over maternalist labor standards produced a “tug of
war” between Detroit’s “two top women in labor union circles.”84 Caroline Davis,
Chair of the Women’s Department of the United Auto Workers (UAW), fought to
repeal Michigan’s sex-specific hours’ law.85 In the postwar period, as women’s incomes became increasingly essential to familial economic security, the UAW’s female membership began to smart under the constraints of the maternalist labor regime.86 Davis was willing to risk some labor protection in exchange for greater
employment opportunity. Myra Wolfgang, a leader in the Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees Union (HERE),87 strenuously opposed the repeal. Wolfgang
and other labor feminist activists feared that the erosion of maternalist labor standards would benefit “highly skilled or favorably situated women” while harming
“those with the least skill and bargaining power.” 88 They warned that eliminating
maternalist labor standards would wash away a regulatory floor that represented the
labor movement’s best hope to augment legal oversight of the employment relationship.89 The literature dismisses Wolfgang and others like her as horribly outdated
—women who embraced a protectionist paradigm rooted in gender stereotypes. 90
Wolfgang, however, argued that labor protections were necessary not because of

83. See Zimmerman, supra note 81, at 197–200.
84. Ruth Carlton, Women’s Work—How Many Hours?, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 19, 1967, at
1D (on file with Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s
Department Papers); see Helen Fogel, Judge Tells Women To Prove that Overtime Is Harmful,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 19, 1969 (same); Colleen O’Brien, Angry Women Charge Secret
Repeal of Law Protecting Workers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 18, 1967 (same).
85. Carlton, supra note 84; Fogel, supra note 84.
86. On working-class women’s frustration with maternalist labor laws, see Katherine
Turk, “With Wages So Low How Can a Girl Keep Herself?”: Protective Labor Legislation
and Working Women’s Expectations, 27 J. POL’Y HIST. 250 (2015).
87. COBBLE, supra note 9, at 2.
88. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 263 (quoting National Consumers’ League
letterhead (January 1967) (on file in Folder 657, Box 529, Esther Peterson Collection,
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College))); Memorandum from Katherine Pollak Ellickson,
Chairman, Comm. on Labor Standards, Nat’l Consumers League (Mar. 1, 1967).
89. Letter from Dorothy I. Height, Nat’l President, Nat’l Council of Negro Women, Inc.,
to Luther Holcomb, Acting Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n 2 (July 7, 1966),
(on file with Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s
Department Papers) (“[T]here is some misunderstanding of the importance of maintaining
present State labor standards for women until such time as the laws are reexamined and improved to provide good labor standards for all workers . . . .”); Letter From Dorothy I. Height,
supra note 78 (same).
90. But see COBBLE, supra note 9 (recovering the political vision of labor feminists, from
the New Deal through the 1960s); TURK, supra note 68 (arguing that working-class women
advocated an interpretation of Title VII that acknowledged the gendered division of labor and
departed from a narrow, sameness model).
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biological sex differences but because of the “second shift”91 that working-class
women performed in the home.92
The divide between Davis and Wolfgang arose because the UAW and HERE were
differently situated under law and within the labor market. 93 The UAW enjoyed
coverage under the FLSA and, therefore, following the repeal of Michigan’s hours
law the UAW’s female membership would receive premium pay for overtime
work.94 By contrast, many workers in the hotel and restaurant industries—unionized
and not—lacked coverage under the FLSA because they were understood to work in
intrastate commerce.95 In addition, UAW women could rely on strong bargaining
agreements to protect them from involuntary overtime. 96 Seventy percent of
Michigan’s women workers were not unionized, however, and many of these workers labored in the low-income clerical, retail, and service sectors.97 Lastly, the maledominated auto industry promised well-paying jobs, which employers restricted to
men on the basis of state protective laws.98 By contrast, the elimination of state-based
protective laws did not offer the same opportunity to women workers in highly feminized sectors of the labor market, where few masculinized jobs existed.99
Within a year of their contest over the elimination of the women’s hours law,
Davis and Wolfgang—formerly bitter enemies—had joined forces. To the surprise
of almost all observers, the UAW and HERE forged a united front in a campaign for

91. On women’s performance of a second shift in the home, see ARLIE HOCHSCHILD &
ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME
(rev. ed. 2012).
92. The hours law, Wolfgang believed, took account of the sociological difference between men and women’s roles within the family. O’Brien, supra note 84.
93. The political science and legal literature characterizes the debate about maternalist
labor standards as one between advocates of “equal” and “special” treatment for women. E.g.,
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 5154 (3d ed. 2013). See
generally LISE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB (1993) (characterizing debates within feminism
about the legal regulation of pregnancy, from the Progressive Era through the 1980s). But this
is an ahistorical characterization, which treats debate over advocacy strategies as emerging
wholly from ideological disagreement rather than from material conditions and constraints on
political action. The debate arose not from advocates’ disparate views on gender roles but
rather because of the disparate locations of working-class women within their families, the
labor market, and the law.
94. See JOHN BARNARD, AMERICAN VANGUARD 150–52 (2004).
95. See Mettler, supra note 82, at 64447. Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act
in 1966 extended coverage to hotel and restaurant employees employed by businesses doing
greater than $250,000 per year in business. Susan Kocin, Basic Provisions of the 1966 FLSA
Amendments, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1967, at 1, 3. Yet the amendments retained exemptions for these employees pertaining to overtime pay. Id.
96. See, e.g., Jeff R. Crump & Christopher D. Merrett, Scales of Struggle: Economic Restructuring in the U.S. Midwest, 88 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 496, 504–05 (1998)
(describing the UAW’s economic and political power in the period between 1960 and 1970).
97. Carlton, supra note 84.
98. See BARNARD, supra note 94 at 454–56 (describing the gender and racial composition
of the UAW and differentials in wages).
99. See Carlton, supra note 84 (“With this protective legislation thrown out, nothing is to
stop the employer from working women 11 hours a day.”); see also O’Brien, supra note 84
(“I’m concerned about the majority of women who won’t have protection after Nov. 2.”).
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legislation that would result in more humane work hours for men as well as
women.100 They advocated a universal, voluntary-overtime law that would enable all
nonprofessional workers—male and female—to reject a request for overtime without
employer retaliation.101 Labor feminists and their unions interpreted the emerging
principle of sex equality under law as an impetus to extend protective labor standards
from women to men. Just as maternalism had acted as a wedge to crack Lochnerism,
now sex equality might serve as a lever to expand protections for labor. Labor feminists sought to implement Title VII’s guarantees to equal treatment under law within
a regime of robust labor regulation rather than within a neoliberal, deregulated labor
market.
The campaign for universal state protective laws posed a new way out of an old
and painful strategic dilemma: whether to prioritize equal employment opportunity
or protection for workers. A universal hours law would offer protection to male and
female workers not then covered by federal or state labor laws. Unlike sex-based
hours laws, however, employers could not use a universal hours law as a justification
to exclude women from job opportunities. The fight for the expansion of protective
labor legislation—not the fight to strike down sex-based protective laws, as the common wisdom dictates—obviated the choice between protection and opportunity. The
struggle held out the hope of fusing two strands within American liberalism: a commitment to labor protection forged in the Progressive Era and the New Era and a
newer, Civil Rights–Era commitment to antidiscrimination.
Employers, however, fought hard to construct a sex-equality regime that vitiated
rather than universalized sex-specific labor standards. In Michigan, the Big Three
automobile companies welcomed some feminists’ challenge to maternalist labor
standards.102 Protective laws gummed up the wheels of production. Employers had
long opposed them.103 Their repeal would offer enhanced flexibility and control over
the production process, including the freedom to make female employees work long
and erratic hours. After Michigan repealed its sex-based maximum hours law, women reported having to work as long as seventy or eighty or more hours per week.104

100. Press Release, United Auto Workers, Coalition Spurs Senate Action on Voluntary
Overtime Bill (Dec. 9, 1970) (on file with Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University,
Detroit UAW Women’s Department Papers).
101. Id.
102. Memorandum from Stephen I. Schlossberg & Bernard F. Ashe, Gen. Counsel, United
Auto Workers, to Leonard Woodcock and Ernie Moran, Int’l Vice President and Admin.
Assistant, United Auto Workers (May 23, 1968) (on file with Walter P. Reuther Library,
Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s Department Papers); see also Letter from
Duane D. Daggett, Manager, Labor Relations Dep’t, Ill. State Chamber of Commerce, to
Lillian Hatcher, United Auto Workers of Am. (June 14, 1967); Letter from Duane D. Daggett,
Manager, Labor Relations Dep’t, Ill. State Chamber of Commerce, to Stephen Schlossberg,
Gen. Counsel, United Auto Workers (June 14, 1967) (on file with Walter P. Reuther Library,
Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s Department Papers); Letter from Barbara
DeCaire to Caroline Davis, Dir., UAW Women’s Dep't (Sept. 29, 1965) (on file with Walter
P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s Department Papers).
103. SUSAN LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN,
19051925, at 237 (1987).
104. See Hostess Cake and Title VII, WORKERS’ POWER, Oct. 9–22, 1970, at 4 (“Prior to
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By contrast with their support for repeal of maternalist labor standards, employers
vociferously opposed universal protective laws. They warned that a voluntaryovertime law would have “dire consequences on production schedules.”105 The argument that protective laws threatened productivity held increasing sway over politicians in Michigan and across the nation, as the United States transitioned from a
period of relative affluence to one of greater scarcity. In 1971, the last of the legislative proposals for voluntary overtime in Michigan was met with defeat.106 An additional five states considered but rejected voluntary-overtime legislation over the
course of the 1970s.107
The loss of the campaign for voluntary-overtime laws had long-lasting consequences. In Michigan, the Big Three auto companies had defeated legislation that
would have given nonprofessional workers of different sexes, in the words of union
activists, “leisure time to be with their families, for living and relaxing, . . . [and time]
to perform their duties as citizens.” 108 The lack of state-imposed hours limits made
reconciling work with family and civic life a private, and increasingly difficult, individual responsibility.
2. Employers’ Use of Title VII as a Deregulatory Tool
As the vision for voluntary overtime withered on the vine, employers turned to
Title VII as a mechanism to deregulate the employment relationship. Historian
Katherine Turk has shown how employers in the hotel industry used courts’ narrow
interpretations of sex equality to their own advantage. These employers leveled
wages between male and female hotel workers while simultaneously deskilling and
degrading the work of housemaids.109 A similar dynamic was at work in employers’
response to the conflict between Title VII and maternalist labor standards. Whereas
feminists had sought to use sex equality as a legal principle that might augment and

the ruling, women at the Hostess plant were on three shifts per day, of eight hours each. However, after the ruling, the plant moved to two shifts, and the women have worked an average
of 67 hours per week.” (emphasis in original)); Letter from Emily Rosdolsky, United Auto
Workers, to Walter Reuther, President, United Auto Workers 2 (Mar. 3, 1969) (on file with
Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s Department
Papers) (describing the conditions of some women working “as many as 69 hours a week”
while others worked “12 hours a day, seven days a week”).
105. Big Three Read from Same Script in Opposing Limits on Overtime, MICH. AFL-CIO
NEWS, Mar. 26, 1969 (on file with Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit
UAW Women’s Department Papers).
106. The UAW testified on behalf of the last maximum hours bill considered by the state
legislature in June 1971. See Testimony of Int’l Union, UAW, Relative to Legislation
Regulating Maximum Compulsory Hours of Work, to Comm. on Labor, Mich. House of Representatives (June 7, 1971) (on file with Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University,
Detroit UAW Women’s Department Papers).
107. See Brad Knickerbocker, More Workers Balking at Compulsory Overtime, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 22, 1978, at 7.
108. Dorothy Haener, Int’l Representative, Int’l Union, UAW, Statement at Public Hearing
to the Mich. Occupational Standards Comm’n 7 (Aug. 19, 1968) (on file with Walter P.
Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s Department Papers).
109. TURK, supra note 68, at 142–50.
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universalize protective labor laws, employers wielded sex discrimination as a deregulatory tool to invalidate state labor laws that regulated women’s minimum wage,
work hours, and other conditions of work. Antidiscrimination law became a mechanism to liberate employers from state labor regulations that undermined managerial
prerogatives.
The tension between maternalist labor standards and Title VII trapped employers
between a rock and a hard place. If they complied with state labor laws, employers
risked violating federal employment discrimination law. Conversely, if they complied with federal law, then they risked prosecution under state law. Employers began
to embrace the sex equality provision of Title VII, in part as a way out of the legal
uncertainty they faced.
Yet employers also deployed Title VII strategically, using antidiscrimination ideals to eliminate protective labor statutes and thereby acquire greater managerial freedom. In 1973, Homemakers, Inc., a Los Angeles based employer of home health
aides, filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.110 Homemakers
alleged that a California law requiring overtime pay for female employees violated
Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate. 111 But there was a catch. Homemakers employed an almost wholly female workforce.112 There was little risk that the company
would face liability for paying women workers more than their male counterparts.
And no law prevented Homemakers from complying with both the state and federal
statutes, by giving the same overtime pay offered to women to any men it hired.113
The lawsuit was, therefore, a thinly veiled effort to reduce the wages that
Homemakers was legally required to pay its employees.
The Homemakers lawsuit exemplified employers’ use of Title VII to invalidate
sex-based state labor laws across the country. Caterpillar Tractor and Illinois Bell
Telephone litigated a successful challenge to a state maximum hours law for
women.114 General Electric Co. litigated in Kentucky to win the right to give women
workers overtime assignments.115
Employers’ use of Title VII as a deregulatory tool had an analogue in the civil
rights context. Sophia Lee shows that conservatives in the 1970s used civil rights
ideals to build the right-to-work movement.116 They appealed to African Americans
to support the movement by pointing to racism within unions and the broader labor
movement. Right-to-work advocates focused particular attention on “union shop”
rules that imposed mandatory collective-bargaining fees on all employees, regardless
of whether any individual worker actually belonged to the union. Therefore, these
advocates argued, “union shop” rules effectively coerced African Americans into

110. Homemakers, Inc., of L.A. v. Div. of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111, 1111–12
(N.D. Cal. 1973), aff’d, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974).
111. Id. at 1112.
112. See generally EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA 6–8 (2012) (describing the racial and gender composition of the home-care industry).
113. See Homemakers, 356 F. Supp. at 1112 (“Defendants urge that extension of the benefits to male employees may be granted pursuant to ‘Equal Pay’ laws . . . .”).
114. NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF 214–15 (2015).
115. Id. at 215.
116. See SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW
RIGHT 227–29 (2014).
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funding the same unions that discriminated against them. 117 In addition, employers
used allegations of race discrimination to block the certification of unions by the
National Labor Relations Board.118 In these ways, right-to-work activists and employers used concepts of race equality under both statutory and constitutional law to
undermine labor organization.
The advocacy strategies of employers comported with broader political shifts. In
the early 1970s, conservative strategists turned to formal equality as a means to push
back against the gains of both the civil rights and women’s movements and attracted
a broader political base to the Republican Party. As explicit racism became less politically palatable, strategists marginalized white supremacists who had joined the
Republican Party en masse after the passage of the Civil Rights Act. 119 At the same
time, these Republican strategists strove to redefine civil rights as “equality of opportunity” not “equality of results.”120 They fashioned a “color-blind” conception of
race equality to appeal to white voters. The turn away from explicit racism also created the political space necessary to attract some higher-income minorities to the
Republican Party.121 Political strategists thus joined antiunion activists, business-side
employment lawyers, and the National Labor Relations Board in reformulating civil
rights in ways that substituted formal conceptions of race equality for substantive
ones. Similarly, employers’ efforts to institutionalize sex-discrimination law in ways
that would invalidate protective labor laws undermined labor feminists’ substantive
visions for sex equality and, instead, substituted formalist interpretations.
Employers’ use of litigation under Title VII to promote managerial liberty in structuring the workplace thus formed part of a broader neoliberal appropriation of civil
rights ideals.
Employers’ lawsuits challenging sex-based state labor laws under Title VII raised
the question of what remedy a court should impose when the federal statute
preempted a state law. Most courts reasoned that invalidation of the state law was
the only option. The district court in Homemakers recognized that the company’s
lawsuit was self-serving.122 Yet the court saw no option but to strike down the minimum wage law. Extending the state overtime law to men, the court reasoned, would
usurp the legislative function.123 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.124
The courts, however, did not have to interpret Title VII in ways that eroded state
protective laws. When faced with the conflict between sex-based state labor standards and Title VII, the courts had another remedial option other than striking down
the state law. They might have required employers to comply with both federal and
state law by extending the benefit or restriction that the state law conferred on women
to men. Extending rather than invalidating sex-based state labor laws would have

117. Id. at 22931.
118. See id. at 18182, 212.
119. MACLEAN, supra note 20, at 205.
120. Id. at 204.
121. See MACLEAN, supra note 20, at 20308.
122. See Homemakers, Inc., of L.A. v. Div. of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111, 1113
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (acknowledging that “this Court may question the motives of plaintiff and
sympathize with its women employees”), aff’d, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974).
123. Id. at 111213.
124. 509 F.2d at 23.
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realized the half-century old aspiration of social feminists and union activists to use
maternalist labor laws as a wedge to realize universal protections. The pressing dilemma was whether the courts rather than state legislatures could properly bring this
ideal to fruition.
Support for the extension remedy came from male plaintiffs, some legal scholars,
and the EEOC. For example, Michael Burns sued his employer, an aerospace firm
called the Rohr Corporation, arguing that Title VII required the company to extend
to men the rest periods guaranteed female workers under California law. 125 Professor
Leo Kanowitz, an authority on sex discrimination, argued that the extension remedy
was the most appropriate.126 The Supreme Court was responsible for the fact that
state protective labor standards were limited to women, as it had struck down sexneutral laws during the Lochner era and had upheld only maternalist regulations.
Therefore, Kanowitz argued, the courts should compensate for its earlier jurisprudence—now discredited—by ordering the extension of maternalist laws to men.127
In April 1972, the EEOC issued guidelines interpreting Title VII to require employers to extend sex-based minimum wage and premium pay laws from women to men.
The guidelines stated that Title VII similarly required employers to extend other sexbased protective laws regulating work conditions, unless “business necessity” precluded them from doing so. 128
When the state of California appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Homemakers
to the Supreme Court, U.S. Solicitor General Robert Bork likewise took a position
in favor of the extension remedy. 129 Bork submitted a brief in favor of the Court’s
grant of California’s petition for certiorari.130 In the brief, he argued that the extension remedy would not involve federal courts in an inappropriate usurpation of the
state’s legislative function. A court would not itself be rewriting state minimum-wage
laws to include men. Rather, Title VII would be doing the work of extending the
benefits or restrictions under state law from women to men. 131 The Supreme Court,
however, denied certiorari and missed the chance to rule on whether extension or
preemption was the appropriate remedy. 132
In the end, Title VII litigation in the federal courts served as a powerful arrow in
employers’ quiver. As in Homemakers, the Burns court held that extending a sex-

125. Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994, 996 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
126. Leo Kanowitz, Constitutional Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law,
48 NEB. L. REV. 131, 170–71 (1968).
127. Id.
128. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(4)(ii) (2016).
129. Linda Mathews, Court Lets Limit on Overtime Pay for Women Stand, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 1976, at B3.
130. See Cal. Dept. Indus. Rel. v. Homemakers, Inc., of L.A., 421 U.S. 1009 (1975)
(mem.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976); see also Preliminary Memorandum to Harry A.
Blackmun, Supreme Court Justice 8 (May 27 & 28, 1975) (on file with Library of Congress,
Justice Harry A. Blackmun Papers, box 838, folder: 74-1213 Homemakers) (recommending
that the Solicitor General, Bork, “be requested to file an amicus brief were the case to be
taken”).
131. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 130.
132. Homemakers, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976).
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based state labor standard to men would violate the separation of powers.133 Only
one federal circuit court reached a different conclusion,134 and even that decision was
reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.135
The decade following the forgotten campaign for universal labor protections witnessed the “opening of the American workplace”—to use historian Nancy
MacLean’s provocative phrase.136 White, male strongholds in the labor market
opened to women and minorities. The relationship between management and workers was opened in new and often unbalanced ways, favoring the power of employers
over workers. In a neoliberal age, freedom came to mean both individual flourishing
free from discrimination and also an employment relationship free from labor
regulation.137
3. Sex-Discrimination Law in a Minimal Welfare State
Let us return to Fraser’s provocative question about whether feminism advanced
neoliberalism.138 Fraser’s argument suffers from the “problems of amnesia,” as Joan
Sangster and Meg Luxton argue. 139 Fraser’s account correctly identifies the end
result—the use of feminism for neoliberal purposes—but gets the causal force
wrong. As historian Lisa Duggan argues, it was advocates for neoliberal economic
policies, not feminists, who promoted “the privatization of the costs of social reproduction, along with the care of human dependency needs.”140 Katherine Turk shows

133. Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994, 997 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (calling such extension
“usurpation”).
134. Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081, 108384 (8th Cir. 1972) (requiring an
employer to comply with both Title VII and an Arkansas state law requiring premium pay for
overtime work by women by extending the premium pay to men), aff’g 318 F. Supp. 1368
(E.D. Ark. 1970).
135. State v. Fairfield Cmtys. Land Co., 538 S.W.2d 698 (Ark. 1976) (interpreting state
legislative intent to extend premium pay only to women on the basis of concern for the health
of female employees rather than on the basis of regulating wages and hours generally), cert.
denied sub nom. Ark. Dep’t of Labor v. Fairfield Cmtys. Land Co., 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
136. MACLEAN, supra note 20.
137. My causal claim, therefore, is not that the executives of the Big Three automobile
companies and other employers or business trade association leaders themselves were necessarily self-consciously committed to neoliberal interests. Rather, it is that their pursuit of managerial flexibility, the erosion of labor regulation, and the reduction of substantive equality to
individual freedom paved the way for a neoliberal workplace. Business interests used the antidiscrimination ideal to invalidate one political justification for state labor standards—protection of motherhood—and to delegitimate other possible justifications such as all workers’ need
for family and civic time.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 61–66.
139. Joan Sangster & Meg Luxton, Feminism, Co-optation and the Problems of Amnesia:
A Response to Nancy Fraser, in SOCIALIST REGISTER 2013: THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY 288,
296 (Leo Panitch, Greg Albo & Vivek Chibber, eds., 2012) (“Women workers cannot be
blamed for promoting economic independence and ending up with the multi-earner, low-wage
family; they reacted to changing economic conditions with the strategies they saw available
and possible to sustain themselves and their families.”).
140. LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? 14 (2003) (emphasis in original).
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that interpretations of Title VII protecting the white male-breadwinner standard, rather than refashioning work to accommodate the needs of caregivers, gained primacy
only through decades of conflict among working-class women, feminist advocates,
unions, and employers.141 While the UAW and HERE endeavored to use sex-equality
ideals as a mechanism to augment state labor standards, employers used antidiscrimination law to deregulate labor standards and enhance managerial control
over production.
The construction of sex equality to mean equal market opportunity rather than
heightened labor protection deepened the insecurity of men as well as women. In
California, employers had voluntarily extended maternalist labor standards to male
workers as a matter of custom. 142 Eliminating the maternalist standards, therefore,
threatened to lower the floor for all employees. As courts struck down sex-specific
standards, labor feminists advocated legislation that would universalize rather than
eliminate protective labor laws. Formed in 1971, the Union Women’s Alliance to
Gain Equality (“Union WAGE”) campaigned for a bill that would extend the jurisdiction of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the state agency regulating the hours
and conditions of women’s work, to reach male employees as well. 143
Business trade associations such as the California Association of Manufacturers
convinced Governor Ronald Reagan to veto the bill, 144 in part by associating politically the very idea of labor protection with anachronistic gender stereotypes.145 Labor
activists managed to get a weaker version of the bill passed a second time—one that

141. See TURK, supra note 68, passim; see also id. at 203–08.
142. See Assembly Comm. on Labor Relations, California’s Protective Laws for Women
48–49 (Nov. 18, 1969) (unpublished staff memorandum) (on file with Harvard University,
Schlesinger Library, Catherine East Papers) (attached to Letter from John Stephen Spellman,
Consultant, Assembly Comm. on Labor Relations, to Catherine East, Exec. Secretary,
Citizen’s Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Dep’t of Labor (Nov. 19, 1969)) (“[T]he
alternatives are obvious—cover men as well as women, or cover neither.”); Letter from Anne
Draper, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, to David A. Roberti, Chairman,
Labor Relations Comm. (on file with San Francisco State University, Labor Archives and
Research Center at the J. Paul Leonard Library, Union WAGE Records).
143. See Notes on History of Protective Legislation 2–3 (June 25, 1974) (unpublished notes
from Union WAGE Workshop) (on file with San Francisco State University, Labor Archives
and Research Center at the J. Paul Leonard Library, Union WAGE Records).
144. See Homemakers, Inc., of L.A. v. Div. of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111, 1113
(N.D. Cal. 1973); Brown, Enrolled Bill Memorandum to Governor, Bill. No. AB 1710 (Dec.
11, 1972) (unpublished summary) (on file with Governor’s Vetoed Bill File, California State
Archives).
145. E.g., Letter from C.T. Morton, Chairman of Board & Consultant, DuncansonHarrelson Co., to Governor Ronald Reagan (Dec. 8, 1972) (on file with California State
Archives, Vetoed Bill File) (“It is unnecessary to point out that since the days of Neanderthal
man, the male, on average, has grown larger and physically stronger than the female . . . to the
advantage of the human race.”); Letter from Philip Steinberg, Reg’l Vice President, Am. Inst.
of Merch. Shipping, to Governor Ronald Reagan (Nov. 22, 1972) (on file with California State
Archives, Vetoed Bill File) (“If the implications arising from this ludicrous legislation were
not so serious, the thought of applying special women’s protective laws to women would be
humorous.”).
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gave employers greater control over the state administrative process.146 In 1974, business interests captured the regulatory process and Reagan’s conservative appointees
to the Industrial Welfare Commission vitiated the state’s protective labor standards.147 Union WAGE and other labor activists protested at public hearings, wearing
shrouds and carrying placards and banners that read, “10 hour day—no way” and
“Women need protective laws, men do too.” 148 They would spend the rest of the
decade locked in cyclical struggles with business groups over state labor standards.
With hindsight, the warnings of Myra Wolfgang and Union WAGE activists appear even more prescient. The end of maternalism coincided with an economic transformation that deepened its costs and made less salient its opportunities. Service employees comprised nearly sixty percent of the American workforce in 1970; that
proportion reached seventy percent by 1980 and only continued to increase
thereafter.149 These economic changes placed increasing proportions of workers beyond the reach of federal labor law and reliant on state labor law. At the same time,
the kind of well-remunerated, blue-collar industrial jobs with good benefits that the
UAW workers held all but disappeared. The nation transitioned to a service economy
characterized for many workers by low-income, dangerous, and contingent labor.150
Unionization rates in the private sector declined dramatically. In this context, the
failure to use Title VII as a mechanism to augment, rather than eviscerate, state labor
standards appears all the more tragic.
In the late twentieth-century United States, the advent of sex-discrimination law
helped to facilitate the neoliberal restructuring of employment. 151 The decline of maternalism removed a legal justification that had long legitimated state protective labor
laws: support for motherhood. On a political level, the labor movement lost a

146. See Notes on History of Protective Legislation, supra note 143, at 3.
147. See Deborah Dinner, Equal by What Measure?: The Lost Struggle for Universal State
Protective Labor Standards, in MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, VULNERABILITY,
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 31) (on file with the Indiana Law
Journal) (describing how procedural requirements gave business groups a role in the
administrative process and that in 1974 three of five commissioners were sympathetic to
management).
148. Elaine Reed, IWC Hears Women’s Protest, OAKLAND TRIB., Apr. 25, 1974, at 25 (on
file with San Francisco State University, Labor Archives and Research Center at the J. Paul
Leonard Library, Union WAGE Records).
149. Joan Smith, The Paradox of Women’s Poverty: Wage-Earning Women and Economic
Transformation, 10 SIGNS 291, 294 tbl. 1 (1984).
150. See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
151. My claim, therefore, is not that the elimination of maternalist labor standards necessarily advanced neoliberalism. It did so in the specific historical context of the 1970s United
States where a feminist interest in equal employment opportunity converged with employers’
interests in managerial flexibility and the maximization of production. Had employers not defeated the labor-feminist struggle to universalize state labor standards, then antidiscrimination
law would have promised equal employment opportunity without advancing neoliberalism.
Similarly, to argue that the end of maternalism facilitated the neoliberal market is not to argue
for the normative desirability of a legal regime which reinforced gender stereotypes and the
family wage system. Rather, the historical advocacy of labor feminists themselves offers an
alternative ideal: equal employment opportunity coupled with universal labor protections.
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foothold—labor regulations for women—from which it had hoped to reach heightened labor standards for both male and female workers. As a consequence, women
gained the right to equal employment opportunity in a labor market that lacked protections for those workers who were not members of strong unions and who remained
outside federal labor law. The end of maternalism relegated many working-class
women, as well as men in feminized occupations, to the employment status workers
had suffered in the Lochner era.152 Classical liberal principles of individual contracting in a private market characterizes the employment status of a growing proportion
of America’s working class.
It was not inevitable that the rise of sex-discrimination law would herald a demise
of state labor regulation. Labor feminists’ campaign for universal protective standards, including voluntary-overtime laws, suggests a historical alternative: antidiscrimination law coupled with labor protection. Gender could have been the canary
in the mine, illuminating the need for universal protection; instead, neoliberal uses
of Title VII made antistereotyping a rationale for deregulation. It is essential to interrogate the reasons why the antidiscrimination paradigm ascended while that of
labor protection declined. This Article’s revisionist history of the demise of maternalist labor standards helps to explain the asymmetric achievement of labor feminists’ goals. The convergence between Title VII and neoliberal governance reframed
the problem of injustice in the labor market. Legal and political culture increasingly
focused upon the injustice of exclusion along identity lines rather than inequality of
power between capital and labor. Sex equality came to mean a free market premised
on individual merit, rather than universal protections that restrained the capacity of
employers to exploit the most disadvantaged male and female workers.
B. The Framing of Title VII as Efficiency Promoting
Even as employers and business trade associations used employmentdiscrimination law as a deregulatory tool, legal scholarship and doctrine constructed
Title VII as a statute that promoted efficient markets. As an antidiscrimination statute, Title VII could never perform the same functions as labor law in regulating the
balance of power between employers and employees. 153 The statute’s precise meaning, however, was not fixed in 1964 but rather consolidated over time via scholarly
debates and litigation. The enactment of Title VII represented the fulfillment of multiple legal and political objectives, foremost among them the moral commitment to
end racial subordination.154 The idea that Title VII would promote rational labor markets provided a second justification for the statute. As free-market ideology gained

152. For further discussion of the relationship between neoliberal and Lochnerian ideologies, see Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal
Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 78996 (2003).
153. For a nuanced historical discussion of the contradictions between employmentpractices law and labor law and of ensuing conflicts between the civil rights and labor movements, see generally SCHILLER, supra note 73, 14648, 193219.
154. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 20714 (new preface, 2011) (discussing the international diplomatic context that shaped the politics of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 43657 (2004) (examining
how violent massive resistance to African American civil rights protests in the South catalyzed
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traction in legal culture, it became an attractive discourse by which liberal scholars
might frame the normative justification for a highly contested law. Neoliberal ideals
shaped how scholars and judges came to understand the statute’s meaning. The construction of Title VII as efficiency promoting, however, ultimately cabined doctrinal
interpretations of the statute that may have catalyzed structural changes in the workplace that would have protected of workers’ familial and civic lives apart from work.
1. The Birth of Law and Economics and “Fair Employment”
The framing of Title VII in terms of the free market dated to the statute’s enactment.155 Some members of Congress argued that the statute would promote a more
efficient labor market. The House Judiciary Committee Report on President
Kennedy’s proposed civil rights bill, for example, argued that employment discrimination frustrated the nation’s ability to meet the rising need “for managers, clerical
workers, sales workers, craftsmen, foremen, and similar skilled occupational
groups.”156 The Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor contained
further evidence that race discrimination harmed the economy. 157 At its inception,
some supporters of Title VII imagined that realizing black freedom would also promote market rationality; equality would maximize wealth. This framing did not
acknowledge the ambiguities in the statute’s meaning and, specifically, the possibility that the goals of equality and efficiency may at times conflict.

the political will necessary to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964); MACLEAN supra note 20,
at 310 (discussing the aspiration toward racial equality that motivated the enactment of Title
VII). Although it was long a commonplace observation that the “sex” provision of Title VII
was a joke and not the subject of substantive, legislative debate, historical scholarship shows
that the provision resulted from postwar women’s rights advocacy as well as racial politics in
the era and was the subject of meaningful discussion. See Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997) (showing how debates within
competing factions of the women’s movement gave rise to Title VII); Carl M. Brauer, Women
Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J.S. HIST. 37, 4150 (1983) (exploring the role of race in the
passage of the sex provision of Title VII); Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept”
of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 131729 (2012) (arguing that legislators reasoned about the prohibition on employment discrimination on the basis of sex in substantive
rather than dismissive ways).
155. This is perhaps not surprising given that Congress rested its power to enact Title VII
on the Commerce Clause as well as Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 447 & n.22 (2000). The Supreme Court, moreover, upheld the constitutionality of Title VII on the basis of the Commerce Clause alone.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258–61 (1964). The decision in
Heart of Atlanta Motel may be understood as a foundational moment in which antidiscrimination law intertwined with market logic.
156. EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964, at 2151, quoted in Paulette M. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects
Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PITTSBURGH L. REV. 555, 582 (1985).
157. Caldwell, supra note 156, at 582.

2017]

BEY O ND “BES T PRA C T ICES ”

1087

Professor Owen Fiss’s foundational 1971 article, A Theory of Fair Employment
Laws, examined a latent tension within the statute’s liberal goals. 158 Fiss distinguished between the “equal treatment” and “equal achievement” principles underpinning the prohibition on race-based employment discrimination. 159 He grounded
the normative justification for the “equal treatment” principle—what soon came to
be understood as disparate-treatment liability—on the basis of market efficiency as
well as individual fairness.160 The requirement that employers treat job candidates as
formal equals arose, in part, because race was unrelated to job productivity. 161 Fiss
assumed economic rationality on the part of employers: any given employer had an
incentive to maximize productivity by selecting employees on the basis of merit and
not on the basis of an irrelevant characteristic such as race.162 Why then should the
law need to mandate a color-blind workplace? Fiss concluded that market failures
justified the prohibition on disparate treatment.163 A few years later, Paul Brest made
a similar argument to Fiss’s, suggesting that rational discrimination was exceedingly
rare and, ordinarily, was a pretext for racial animus.164 From the start, the leading
scholarly interpretations of Title VII suggested that the purpose of disparatetreatment liability was in part to perfect markets.
The justification of disparate-treatment liability in terms of market efficiency
made disparate-impact liability appear less legitimate. Fiss published A Theory of
Fair Employment when Griggs v. Duke Power Co.165 was pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court.166 The plaintiffs in Griggs alleged that hiring practices that disproportionately excluded African Americans from employment opportunity, regardless of discriminatory intent, violated Title VII.167 Fiss argued that the equalachievement principle rested on ambiguous normative grounds in part because it

158. Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971).
159. Id. at 23849.
160. Id. at 240–44. Disparate-treatment liability arises when an employer treats similarly
situated job candidates or employees differently because of race, sex, or another protected
characteristic. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (“[L]iability depends
on whether the protected trait . . . actually motivated the employer’s decision.”).
161. Fiss, supra note 158, at 241. The prohibition on disparate treatment stemmed from
the fact that the individual had no control over his or her race. Id. at 24142. Scholars have
since questioned whether immutability should be a primary criterion in the analysis of whether
unlawful employment discrimination has occurred. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2 (2015).
162. Fiss, supra note 158, at 241, 249.
163. Id. at 24951. Such failures varied: State-imposed caps on profit might undermine the
incentive to make wealth-maximizing employment decisions based on merit. Id. Or, an employer might be distanced from the employment decision by a management bureaucracy and,
accordingly, the hiring agent would not accurately transmit the employer’s economic incentives. Id.
164. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L
REV. 1, 67 (1976).
165. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
166. Fiss, supra note 158, at 291 n.63 (noting that certiorari had been granted in Griggs).
167. Brief for Petitioner at 48, Griggs, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No. 70-124) (“[W]hatever
Duke’s intent, there is no question that the tests are in fact ‘used’ to discriminate against black
workers.” (emphasis in original)).
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imposed significant costs on employers. 168 Disparate-impact liability was efficient
only when the challenged employment practice did not correlate with worker
productivity.169 But many employer practices that had a potentially unlawful
disparate impact on women and minorities under Title VII nevertheless served
employers’ practices in job productivity. 170 Thus, disparate impact raised a red flag
for any analysis committed to economic maximization. Fiss ultimately concluded
that the law should recognize the equal-achievement principle, but that it should be
limited by “a deep commitment to . . . economic efficiency” in the law. 171
Fiss wrote his famous article while teaching at the University of Chicago, where
the field of law and economics was then blossoming. Henry Simons, an economist
and professor at the law school from the mid-1930s to mid-1940s, had laid the foundation for the law school’s critical role in the field. 172 Simons had attracted to
Chicago the charismatic economist Aaron Director, whose antitrust courses began to
convince students of the importance of economic analysis of the law. 173 Director
founded the Journal of Law and Economics in 1958, which he later coedited along
with Ronald Coase, who joined the Chicago faculty in 1964 four years after publishing his most famous article, The Problem of Social Cost.174 Fiss entered the debate
about employment-discrimination law just as law-and-economics scholarship began
to flourish. Efficiency analysis must have appeared a natural starting point for his
normative analysis.
Fiss’s article not only drew upon economic thought but also responded to and
reshaped it. In his 1962 best-selling treatise, Capitalism and Freedom, University of
Chicago economist Milton Friedman argued against fair-employment laws.175 Like
Fiss and other subsequent scholars, Friedman believed that capitalism would naturally reduce discrimination.176 Yet Friedman characterized the propensity to discrim-

168. Fiss, supra note 158, at 257–58. Fiss argued that the “equal achievement” principle
was also normatively troublesome because it threatened individual fairness. See id. at 26365.
169. See id. at 239 (discussing how criteria may be related to productivity but disadvantage
classes based on “historic legacy”).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 313.
172. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 91–94
(2008).
173. Id. at 9396.
174. RODGERS, supra note 67, at 57; TELES, supra note 172, at 9596. Richard Posner
joined the Chicago law faculty in 1969 and published his path-breaking Economic Analysis of
the Law four years later. TELES, supra note 172, at 98. Posner’s prolific scholarship across
multiple legal fields, stellar credentials, capacity to spark scholarly argumentation, and numerous acolytes popularized the discipline. See RODGERS, supra note 67, at 58. Soon law and
economics attracted sizeable donations from the Olin Foundation, Liberty Fund, and numerous
corporations, whose contributions facilitated the training of judges and law professors and the
creation of professional networks. See TELES, supra note 172, at 110–15. Whereas lawyers
had not previously conceived of economic maximization as highly relevant to law, ideas about
costs and efficiency became central analytic tools for understanding judicial doctrine during
the 1970s. RODGERS, supra note 67, at 5660; TELES, supra note 172, at 13234.
175. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108–18 (40th anniversary ed. 2002).
176. Id. at 109 (“We have already seen how a free market separates economic efficiency
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inate as merely a taste or preference; in a free society, the best way to dissuade someone of his or her poor taste was through persuasion. 177 Friedman argued that state
coercion of nondiscriminatory employment practices unjustly interfered in freedom
of contract.178 Such interference was not justified by the harm posed to African
Americans because, in Friedman’s view, employment discrimination constituted a
“negative” rather than “positive” harm. 179 By arguing that principles of fairness
counterweighed interests in freedom of contract, Fiss challenged Friedman’s fundamental premise that market principles should delimit the state’s response to racial
inequality. In suggesting that market failures justified antidiscrimination laws, however, Fiss also refashioned economic thought to make it consistent with principles of
formal equality. His article, therefore, can be understood as a critical moment in the
evolution of neoliberal ideology during which antidiscrimination law was sewn into
its fabric.
Fiss’s broader intellectual commitments make it particularly striking that he
framed Title VII’s purpose in terms of capitalist rationality. Fiss famously argued
that constitutional equal protection meant much more than the limit on government’s
power to classify on the basis of race. Fiss argued that the purpose of equal protection
was far broader: the Constitution promised an end to state subordination of disadvantaged classes.180 In developing a group-based interpretation of equal protection,
Fiss challenged the primacy of individualism in constitutional theory. Throughout
his career, furthermore, Fiss evinced a “deep suspicion” of capitalism precisely because of its individualistic premises.181 He critiqued law and economics for
relativizing values,182 and by 1989 he proclaimed that the interest in “the efficiency

from irrelevant characteristics.”). Friedman argued that discrimination was inefficient because
it imposed costs on the discriminator—not only on the victim of discrimination—by raising
the price of goods the discriminator purchased or lowering the value of his labor. Id. at 10910.
177. Id. at 11011.
178. Id. at 112–13.
179. Id. at 11213 (defining “positive harm” as active coercion to force someone into a
contract which he would not otherwise enter and “negative harm” as the failure to enter a
contract with a willing seller).
180. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976); see also Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 910 (2003).
181. Anthony Kronman, Individualism and Anti-Individualism in the Work of Owen Fiss,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 117, 122 (2003); see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (arguing that given unequal resources “settlement[s] will be at odds
with a conception of justice that seeks to make the wealth of the parties irrelevant.”); Owen
M. Fiss, Capitalism and Democracy, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 908, 91119 (1992) (suggesting that
capitalism is in tension with several principles of democracy); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and
Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 141213 (1986) (arguing that the First Amendment’s
protection of speakers’ “autonomy” may distort public debate in capitalist and other societies
that distribute power unequally).
182. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 58 (1986) (critiquing
the reduction of value to competing preferences with equal claims for satisfaction); see also
Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 5–8 (critiquing the reduction
of justice to efficiency defined as preference maximization).
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hypothesis” had subsided.183 That Fiss was compelled in 1971 to justify the
prohibition on differential treatment in terms of market rationality only shows the
discursive power of the then burgeoning law-and-economics movement. A Theory of
Fair Employment was thus illustrative not of Fiss’s broader intellectual trajectory but
rather of a particular historical moment—one in which advocates of fair employment
came to justify their commitment in what was then perhaps the most powerful
jurisprudential school of thought within the legal academy.184 The birth of “fair
employment” was inextricable from that of law-and-economics scholarship, and the
two would further entangle over ensuing decades.
As the idea that market rationality both justified and delimited the scope of Title
VII grew increasingly popular, a corresponding blindness developed to the tension
that Fiss had identified between efficiency and substantive equality. Historian Daniel
Rodgers explains that microeconomic theory and law-and-economics scholarship in
the 1970s yielded a conception of the market as abstracted from social relationships.185 Earlier theories of the market focused on particularized social experiences.
For example, Adam Smith had opened The Wealth of Nations with a close examination of the division of labor that organized production in an English pin factory. 186
David Ricardo’s theory of rent came from an analysis of the interaction between
landowners and tenant farmers.187 In contrast, the new market theory in the 1970s
exhibited a “detachment from history and institutions and from questions of
power.”188 Through the 1970s and 1980s, dominant strains of legal scholarship and
doctrine came to forget Fiss’s insight that abstracted maxims of economic productivity were insufficient to achieve substantive equality. In place of Fiss’s ambivalence, jurisprudence evinced an increasing skepticism of disparate-impact liability.
2. The Consequences of the Efficiency Frame for Disparate-Impact Doctrine
The disparate-impact doctrine met the most success in the early years after
Griggs, in cases that challenged racial exclusion from the workplace. Disparateimpact liability helped to dismantle education and testing requirements in the South,
which employers had implemented to evade Title VII’s prohibition on formal race
discrimination.189 As Michael Selmi explains, intent was likely present as a sociological matter, but plaintiffs could not prove disparate treatment. 190 Disparate-impact

183. Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 245 (1989).
184. On the diffusion of law and economics in the wake of the Chicago School, see generally Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303 (2005)
(arguing that this jurisprudential movement simultaneously lost its intellectual coherence and
thrived in its expansiveness).
185. See RODGERS, supra note 67, at 44.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 4445.
188. Id. at 76.
189. See ROBERT BELTON, THE CRUSADE FOR EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE (Stephen L.
Wasby ed., 2014).
190. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
71416 (2006).
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liability, therefore, served an evidentiary function.191 Scholars have noted that this
narrow interpretation of the theory was more palatable to courts because it did not
wholly displace intent as the rationale for liability. 192
Yet early disparate-impact claims’ success can also be attributed to the fact that
disparate-impact liability functioned to eliminate market irrationalities in these cases.
Job tests and qualifications such as those invalidated in Griggs were wholly unrelated
to job performance. They thus excluded job applicants who would otherwise have
worked at equal levels of productivity as those hired, without any additional expenditure by employers.193 Even if employers did not intend to use the tests to discriminate,
their use represented market-irrational practices. These early race-based disparateimpact cases, therefore, resembled disparate treatment to the extent that both forms
of liability dismantled inefficient practices of race discrimination. The early trajectory of the disparate-impact doctrine promoted capitalist rationality.
From the start, the Supreme Court defined the boundaries of disparate-impact liability with reference to business’s economic interests. As a hypothetical matter, the
Court might have decided that the nation’s commitment to racial inclusion was so
great as to prohibit facially neutral practices that had the effect of excluding African
Americans, regardless of the relationship between the employment practice and
workplace productivity. This was never the Court’s conclusion, however; the right
to consideration for employment extends only insofar as one can perform the job at
a minimum level of productivity. Accordingly, Griggs held that employers bore “the
burden of showing that any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.”194 Job tests were valid insofar as they were “demonstrably
a reasonable measure of job performance.” 195 In the next disparate-impact case to
reach the Court, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court held that the defendant
employer failed to meet its burden of showing that two tests purportedly measuring
nonverbal intelligence and verbal facility were “job related.” 196 In dicta, however,
the Court reasoned that even were an employer to meet that burden, a plaintiff might
still show that other devices that did not have disparate racial effects would similarly
“serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship.’”197 Even in expanding plaintiffs’ rights to invalidate practices that had
discriminatory effects, the Court still tethered the doctrine to workplace productivity.

191. See id.
192. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three,
117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 51819 (2003) (“[T]he inquiry into the existence of a racial classification can be directed by normative judgments about motive or other substantive aspects of
equal protection . . . .”).
193. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 891
n.86 (2001) (“[D]isparate impact law should forbid the use of a hiring criterion that does not
correlate with productivity so long as it disproportionately excludes members of a protected
group.”).
194. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
195. Id. at 436.
196. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The tests were prerequisites to access the relatively skilled and
higher-paid job lines previously restricted to white workers. Id. at 42729.
197. Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
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Though cabined by concern for employers’ profit motive, disparate-impact liability still imposed costs on employers. 198 Validating job tests to avoid liability could
be expensive. Four years after Griggs, Duke Power Co. had yet to complete more
than ten validation studies ordered by the Court, citing their expense as a justification.199 Economists estimated that the costs of a single validation study could range
from $20,000 to $100,000.200 A front-page Wall Street Journal article concluded that
many employers were consequently retreating from job tests altogether because of
the expense of validation.201 Several commentators elaborated on Fiss’s work, arguing that “Congress did not intend to promote the goal of increased minority employment at the expense of business efficiency.”202 Some argued that both legislative history and Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Griggs favored the “equal
treatment” rather than the “equal achievement” principle and that, as a consequence,
the “business necessity” defense should be interpreted leniently as requiring proof
only of a valid business purpose.203
Debates about sex discrimination in the mid-1970s offer insight into how ideas
about gender and about efficiency intersected in ways that limited disparate-impact
liability. As Professor Deborah Widiss argues, a dilemma about how to reconcile
concepts of equality with physical differences between the sexes inflected debates
about both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact doctrine.204 In 1972, the EEOC
promulgated guidelines stating that employer sick-leave and temporary-disability
policies, inadequate to protect the job security of childbearing women, may have an
unlawful disparate effect on women.205 In the several years that followed, lowercourt decisions adopted the guidelines’ reasoning in holding that the exclusion of
pregnancy from otherwise comprehensive, temporary-disability insurance schemes
violated Title VII.206 In 1976, however, the Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
held that such a pregnancy exclusion did not constitute sex discrimination. 207
As I have argued elsewhere, both the Supreme Court justices and civil rights and
feminist activists understood Gilbert as a referendum about disparate-impact liability

198. As Christine Jolls shows, disparate-impact liability always imposes costs on employers. Employers will have to expend more resources to employ the category of workers that the
prohibited employment practice disproportionately burdens. See Christine Jolls, Commentary,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV L. REV. 642, 65266 (2001).
199. Hal Lancaster, Job Tests Are Dropped by Many Companies Due to Antibias Drive,
WALL. ST. J., Sept. 3, 1975, at 1.
200. James Gwartney, Ephraim Asher, Charles Haworth & Joan Haworth, Statistics, the
Law and Title VII: An Economist’s View, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 643 (1979).
201. Lancaster, supra note 199.
202. E.g., Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A NoAlternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 107 (1974).
203. E.g., Marcus B. Chandler, Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to DisparateImpact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911, 91833 (1979).
204. Deborah A. Widiss, Griggs at Midlife, 113 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1002, 1005 (2015)
(reviewing BELTON, supra 189).
205. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (2016).
206. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 991
n.129 (2013) (gathering cases).
207. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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more broadly.208 The majority opinion held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that
General Electric Co.’s policy had disparate effects on women because they had not
produced evidence showing that the company spent less on female employees’ benefits, as a whole, than on male employees’ benefits. 209 The plaintiffs, by contrast, argued that Griggs dictated the conclusion that a policy that denied only pregnant employees benefits otherwise generally available had a disparate impact on women. 210
Legal historian Serena Mayeri shows that Justices Powell and Stewart at first agreed,
but ultimately provided the votes that solidified the six-justice majority.211 Justice
Blackmun, however, fought to change language in the majority opinion that might
otherwise have threatened the lawfulness of the disparate-impact doctrine.212 A dissent written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall argued that the Court
should have deferred to the EEOC’s conclusion that the pregnancy exclusion had an
unlawful disparate effect on women.213
The next year, plaintiffs had more success using disparate-impact liability to challenge height and weight requirements for prison-guard jobs. In Dothard v.
Rawlinson, the majority opinion combatted efforts to weaken disparate-impact liability.214 While the defendant had argued that a plaintiff needed to proffer evidence
of past intentional discrimination to make a disparate-impact claim,215 the majority
held that disparate effects alone would suffice. 216 Yet, as Widiss observes, Justice
Rehnquist’s concurrence devoted attention to how future defendants might defeat a
discrimination challenge to height and weight requirements for jobs similarly requiring physical strength.217 Once again, the Court affirmed the continued validity of
disparate-impact liability while also speaking to its limits. The gender cases thus exposed the limits of the doctrine, even in its early years when the doctrine had tremendous success in combatting racially discriminatory job tests. The limits of the doctrine revealed concerns about efficiency—physical difference, more than racial
stereotypes, posed a deeper dilemma for questions of workplace productivity, safety,
and financial solvency.
The cases that employers and courts viewed as posing the deepest challenge to
workplace productivity, however, concerned not physical sex differences but rather
gendered patterns of caregiving. Beginning in the early 1980s, plaintiffs claimed that

208. See Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the Making of
Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 492–93 (2014).
209. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 13740.
210. See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE 110 (2011).
211. Id. at 111–12.
212. See id. at 113–14.
213. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 15558 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214. 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
215. Widiss, supra note 204, at 1005 & n.57 (citing Brief of Appellants at 3940, Dothard,
433 U.S. 321 (No. 76-422)).
216. Widiss, supra note 204, at 1005 & n.59 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329).
217. Widiss, supra note 204, at 1005 & n.62 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 33740
(Rehnquist, J., concurring)). Lower courts did not take up Rehnquist’s suggestion, however,
and instead continued to strike down height and weight requirements. See, e.g., Blake v. City
of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1375 (1979) (holding that statistical differences in the height
and strength of males and females could not rebut prima facie evidence of disparate impact
caused by a police department’s use of height and physical abilities’ tests).
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employment practices such as very short and conditional sick-leave policies and inflexible work hours failed to recognize caregiver responsibilities and, therefore, disproportionately excluded women from employment opportunities. 218 Such disparateimpact claims challenged the organization of the workplace according to the model
of the ideal worker.
Legal scholar Catharine Albiston argues that courts were hostile to these suits
precisely because they challenged “the taken-for-granted, historically determined relationship between work practices and gender norms.” 219 During the long industrial
revolution, from the late eighteenth through the early twentieth centuries, paid work
came to be understood “in opposition to motherhood.”220 Productive activities associated with men’s labor moved outside the home and grew more time-disciplined
during this period, while women continued to perform task-oriented labor within the
home.221 Courts likewise refashioned common-law doctrines of master and servant
to reinforce a gendered division of labor.222 Judicial opinions constructed the normative worker as a male breadwinner whose sustained and complete dedication to the
workplace was enabled by the domestic labors of his wife in the home. 223 When female plaintiffs challenged the disparate effects of workplace time organization on
women, who in the late twentieth century continued to bear disproportionate responsibility for familial caregiving, courts saw these lawsuits as illegitimate threats to
managerial prerogatives.224 Whether transforming such workplace time norms would
in reality impose overwhelming costs on employers or, instead, enable a more inclusive and productive workplace, remained unanswered. Employers and courts alike
understood gender-based disparate-impact claims as incompatible with workplace
efficiency and as stretching the redistributive capacity of Title VII beyond congressional intent.
In this context, the 1981 case of Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union
was quite remarkable.225 Laurie Abraham worked as an administrative assistant for
the defendant union, and about a month before her anticipated due date she began
what she believed was an approved maternity leave.226 Several weeks later, her employer informed her of its decision to terminate her pursuant to a policy that allowed
only ten days of sick leave.227 In an opinion written by Judge Spottswood Robinson,
a former civil rights attorney and dean of the Howard University School of Law,228

218. See Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 940 & n.54 (1985) (listing cases).
219. Albiston, supra note 23, at 1134.
220. Id. at 1108.
221. Id. at 110712.
222. Id. at 1113.
223. Id. at 111524.
224. See Dinner, supra note 68, at 485–86 (describing how courts characterize pregnancybased disparate-impact claims as efforts to circumvent work requirements and to secure preferential treatment).
225. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
226. Id. at 813.
227. Id. at 813, 81819.
228. MAYERI, supra note 210, at 15–16; Eric Pace, Spottswood W. Robinson 3d, Civil
Rights Lawyer, Dies at 82, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at B11.
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the court reversed the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.229 The court reasoned that because the ten-day leave period fell “considerably short of the period generally recognized in human experience as the respite
needed to bear a child” the policy “portended a drastic effect on women employees
of childbearing age . . . no male would ever encounter.”230
Abraham remained an outlier, however. Only one other federal court decision
recognized that workplace norms regarding leave and work hours may have an unlawful sex-based disparate impact.231 Courts rejected disparate-impact claims to
these employment practices at dual stages of analysis: the inquiry into disparate impact and the inquiry into business necessity. At the initial stage, courts assimilated
disparate-impact liability into a comparative analysis more appropriate to the evaluation of disparate-treatment claims. Courts reasoned that disparate-impact challenges
to neutral workplace time norms constituted demands for “preferential treatment” for
pregnant workers.232 This reasoning, however, ignored that a successful disparateimpact suit would catalyze a remedy that required a more generous leave policy for
all employees and not just pregnant workers.
In addition, courts broadened the business-necessity defense sub silentio in
pregnancy-discrimination cases. The Seventh Circuit, for example, held that to prove
that an absenteeism policy which disproportionately burdened pregnant employees
was unlawful, plaintiffs would have to show more than “that it was not justified by
compelling considerations of business need.” 233 The plaintiffs needed to prove that
the challenged policy was not necessary to the job at all. The court gave the example
of a high school education requirement for a dishwasher. 234 The court reasoned that
the purpose of disparate-impact doctrine was to address situations in which businesses “needlessly . . . excluded black or female workers.” 235 The court thus implicitly lowered the business-necessity standard to a business-irrational standard.
Disparate-impact claims challenging workplace hours and leave policies, such as that
brought by Laurie Abraham, seemed beyond the scope of Title VII because they
functioned as accommodation mandates. Forcing an employer to implement a more
generous leave policy would impose additional costs associated with hiring female

229. Id. at 820.
230. Id. at 819.
231. EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that in
the absence of a business justification, an employer policy of terminating employees who took
sick leave in their first year of employment violated Title VII). For further analysis of related
cases, see Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 41–
49 (2009); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 32–35 (2007).
232. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 86162 (5th Cir. 2002)
(reasoning that courts have no obligation to remedy burdens biologically unique to women
and suggesting that plaintiff’s disparate-impact claim represented an illegitimate demand for
“preferential treatment”); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting a disparate-impact claim on the basis that Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 does not allow “for subsidizing a class of workers”).
233. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583.
234. Id.
235. Id. (quoting Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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workers of childbearing age (presuming those workers utilize the leave at a higher
than average rate).236 Moreover, these claims limited employer control over workplace structures long understood to rest at the heart of managerial prerogatives. Of
course, disparate-treatment liability similarly imposed costs in specific instances. For
example, when customers held racist preferences, hiring racial minorities was more
expensive for employers. There existed, however, a salient distinction between the
“customer preference” cases and the kind of disparate-impact liability claim made in
Abraham. The former imposed on employers and customers the model of a commercial realm free of irrational bias, while the latter challenged the allocation of responsibility for the costs of reproduction between employers and workers which gender
ideologies had naturalized. Abraham was remarkable because it challenged the notion that reproduction was the private responsibility of families.
To conclude, Part II has established that sex-discrimination jurisprudence under
Title VII both bore the imprint of and reinforced neoliberal trends in legal culture.
Litigation under the statute contributed to the erosion of maternalist labor standards.
Opponents of robust labor regulation, moreover, used the antidiscrimination ideal to
delegitimate the ideal of labor protection. In the particular historical context of the
late twentieth-century United States, sex-discrimination law was overlaid on an increasingly flexible and contingent labor market. Even as employment discrimination
came to replace labor protection as the central paradigm for understanding justice
and injustice in the labor market, market logic shaped scholars and courts’ interpretation of Title VII itself. More capacious interpretations of the statute gave way to
jurisprudence that affirmed the primacy of individual rights and efficient markets. In
a neoliberal legal culture, labor feminists’ understanding of sex equality as requiring
collective rights, the redistribution of power between employers and workers, and
robust state protections receded into a quickly forgotten past.
III. TITLE VII AND THE LEGITIMATION OF CLASS INEQUITIES
This Article’s analysis of the relationship between employment-discrimination
law and neoliberalism holds more than historical interest. It raises the question of
whether antidiscrimination law today may legitimate economic inequality, even as it
promotes social inclusion along identity lines. As critical theorist Martha Albertson
Fineman explains: “Formal equality leaves undisturbed—and may even serve to validate—existing institutional arrangements that privilege some and disadvantage others.”237 Historian Thomas Borstelmann observes that after the formal elimination of
sex as well as race hierarchies in the late twentieth century legitimated socioeconomic hierarchies, neoliberals “could more readily claim that the inequalities remaining were the just and reasonable result of letting the natural laws of supply and
demand operate and letting people rise and fall on the basis of their abilities and how
hard they worked.”238 Legal theorists Tucker Culbertson and Jack Jackson argue that

236. See Jolls, supra note 198, at 660–65 (demonstrating that disparate-impact liability
under Title VII poses costs for an employer equivalent to an accommodation mandate).
237. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 3 (2008).
238. THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE 1970S: A NEW GLOBAL HISTORY FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 15 (2012).
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legal reform under Title VII has “produced greater inclusion into existing workplace
structures . . . [while] the structures themselves recede and are reworked in to[sic]
the background presumptions of the political culture.” 239 Part III of this Article extends these insights by examining contemporary employment-discrimination theory
and doctrine.
Even best practices to eliminate employment discrimination are insufficient to
realize a labor market that realizes substantive equality for working-class women.
Employment-discrimination law operates today as a means to perfect the market rather than to challenge its logic and operation. Title VII promotes individual rights to
opportunity rather than collective needs for economic security. In reinforcing the primacy of judicially enforced negative rights, antidiscrimination law obscures the argument for robust social-insurance regimes and welfare entitlements. The resulting,
deregulated labor market and minimal welfare state disproportionately harms
working-class women. Therefore, Title VII may function in a neoliberal context to
legitimate class inequities, even as it opens the market to facilitate greater inclusion
of women and minorities and allows for more fluid expressions of identity in the
workplace. This Article suggests that to address the needs of working-class women,
feminist legal scholars should expend more resources on labor and social-welfare
law rather than antidiscrimination law.
A. Neoliberal Themes in Contemporary Sex Discrimination Scholarship
Contemporary employment-discrimination scholarship bears the imprint of
neoliberalism. Feminist theorists identify antistereotyping as the central principle
animating legal sex-equality theory and doctrine. While the scholarship celebrates
individual freedom and identity expression, it pays little attention to the class-based
limitations of such theories. Market efficiency also remains a dominant theme within
the employment-discrimination literature. Although many scholars reject this value,
it continues to mark a rhetorical border between antidiscrimination and accommodation that cabins the scope of Title VII. The efficiency trope, furthermore, helps to
construct a neoliberal understanding of the market as emptied of thick social identity
and power relations.
1. Antistereotyping Theory and Individualism
Contemporary legal scholarship celebrates the antistereotyping principle as the
dominant theory of sex equality. Mary Anne Case observes that this principle “has
governed constitutional sex discrimination cases since the early 1970s.”240 Kimberly
Yuracko states that the prohibition on sex stereotyping in employment “has been the
most important development in sex discrimination jurisprudence since the passage
of Title VII.”241 The realization of an antistereotyping principle advanced several

239. Culbertson & Jackson, supra note 7, at 150.
240. Case, supra note 72, at 1448. Case elaborates: “[O]ur constitutional standard with
respect to sex is not . . . ‘anti-subordination above all,’ but rather ‘anti-stereotyping’ above
all.” Id. at 1472.
241. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work,
161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 758 (2013).
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feminist objectives: It helped to end a formal system of state-sponsored gender stratification and promoted employer evaluation of women’s individual circumstances
and qualifications. Women gained access to heavy industrial and professional jobs
previously considered “men’s work.”242 To a more limited extent, men gained access
to the benefits afforded employees who are also caregivers in the home, such as family leave.243 Most recently, antistereotyping theory has catalyzed protections for gender nonconforming men and women in the workplace and has prompted courts’
recognition of discrimination against transsexuals.244
The sense of inevitability in employment-discrimination theory about the centrality of the antistereotyping principle, however, should give us pause. There is a seamlessness in the narrative about the principle’s ascendance that makes it appear inexorable. The voices that disrupted that narrative, such as those of Myra Wolfgang and
Union WAGE activists, are eluded. The narrative occludes contemporaneous critiques from the late 1960s and 1970s warning that a constrained political context was
limiting the claims of middle-class feminists in ways harmful to working-class
women.245 Why have we forgotten this history? Feminist legal scholarship is not
merely attentive to the benefits of antistereotyping; it often celebrates that principle
exclusively and dismisses the importance of a labor-protective ideal, treating it as
irredeemably tainted by maternalism.
Might the teleological account of the antistereotyping principle be so appealing
precisely because it comports with broader, neoliberal trends in our legal culture?
Professors Grewal and Purdy observe in passing: “The self-defining, self-exploring,
identity-shifting constitutional citizen of recent Supreme Court discussions of race,
gender, and sexuality . . . reflects the consumer-citizen model of neoliberal economic

242. See generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (analyzing the potential for Title VII to challenge
sex segregation in the workplace and the ways in which the “lack of interest” defense has
limited that potential).
243. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (affirming as a
valid exercise of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, in a case concerning a male
employee’s leave to take care of his wife, the provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act
that provides for damages against a state for denying leave for family care).
244. See Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 157, 170–71, 170 nn. 62–65 (2010) (discussing cases).
245. For example, the dominant narrative celebrates the 1970 Women’s Strike for Equality
organized by NOW leader Betty Friedan and its demands for equal employment opportunity,
abortion rights, and child care. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1988–96 (2003). Yet Bayard Rustin, the chief strategist for the 1963
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, responded to the 1970 Strike with cogent critique. Rustin argued that feminists should instead have advocated full employment, national
health insurance, and universal pre-kindergarten. See MAYERI, supra note 210, at 44. We may
not want to blame feminists for failing to advocate for a more robust form of social citizenship,
as opposed to a narrower conception of gender equality. Yet taking Rustin’s critique seriously
would help us to understand the way in which a neoliberal political context limited the scope
of feminist claims. A richer history, in turn, might inform a broader legal imagination today.
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doctrine . . . .”246 This insight deserves further examination. The rise of the
antistereotyping principle may appear both historically predetermined and normatively correct precisely because it affirms individualism, the elimination of market
irrationalities, and deregulation.
Since the 1970s, three definitions of unlawful sex stereotyping have emerged in
legal doctrine and scholarship. The narrowest definition suggests that a stereotype is
unlawful only when it represents a false generalization.247 This definition suggests
that the factual predicate underpinning the stereotype must be untrue for the stereotype to be unlawful.248 It prohibits only irrational discrimination. 249 A broader definition defines unlawful sex stereotypes to mean “imperfect proxies” and “overbroad
generalizations.”250 This second definition thus prohibits rational discrimination as
well and is the definition that the Supreme Court has adopted to interpret sex discrimination under Title VII.251 In its landmark 1989 decision, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to proscribe prescriptive in addition

246. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 13; see also Martha T. McCluskey, How Queer
Theory Makes Neoliberalism Sexy, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 7, at
115 (arguing that queer theory’s celebration of autonomy, freedom, desire, and satisfaction in
intimate relations converges with the valorization of liberty over equality in neoliberal legal
culture).
247. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 572–74 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. See Render, supra note 15, at 165 (describing prescriptive generalizations and constitutive rules).
249. Both rational and irrational discrimination are based on the use of “proxy traits.” Sujit
Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 145, 155 (2000). Irrational discrimination occurs when the discriminator believes that the trait—such as sex or race—correlates with a job qualification, when it in fact
does not. Id. For example, an employer might irrationally believe that males are better at the
mathematical skills necessary for engineering jobs. Rational discrimination occurs when the
use of proxies has some foundation in fact and, as a result, their use is a cost-saving measure.
Id. at 156.
250. Case, supra note 72, at 146667. Case argues that the Supreme Court strikes down
sex-based generalizations under the law that the Court deems nonuniversal, even if the generalization is empirically accurate. By contrast, the Court upholds sex-based generalizations
when a majority finds that the generalization is universal (whether or not others may agree
with this determination). See id. at 1457–61. The Court’s holding in United States v. Virginia
was exemplary: the majority held the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute
unconstitutional even if most women would be ill-suited to the school’s method of instruction.
518 U.S. at 550 (majority opinion) (“[G]eneralizations about ‘the way women are,’ estimates
of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose
talent and capacity place them outside the average description.”).
251. In its 1978 decision in City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, the Court
held that an employer violated Title VII when it required that female employees make larger
contributions to its pension fund than male employees because, on average, women live longer
than men. 435 U.S. 702, 707–11 (1978). The Court acknowledged that the sex-differentiated
contribution scheme was based on a “real” rather than “fictional difference[] between women
and men.” Id. at 707. The court held, however, that Title VII protected individuals against
discrimination based on membership in a sex-based, racial, or other protected class. Id. at 708.
“Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.” Id.
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to ascriptive stereotyping.252 A voluminous literature explores the precise holding of
Price Waterhouse, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to recapitulate these
debates. Instead, we may rely on the useful typology of interpretations offered by
Kimberly Yuracko.253 Most courts have rejected an interpretation that Price
Waterhouse protects all forms of gender performance in the workplace,254 holding
instead that the case requires either trait neutrality255 or category neutrality.256 Despite their differences, all three definitions of unlawful stereotyping—imperfect
proxy, false generalization, and the prohibition on prescriptive stereotyping—similarly conceptualize the legally cognizable injury. The injury wrought by sex discrimination is that of an artificial limitation on an individual’s capacities, choices, and
gender-related forms of expression. 257
A survey of the literature suggests that many scholars understand the primary
function of Title VII to be the promotion of individual freedom. Mary Anne Case is
one of the most influential thinkers advancing judicial doctrine on the subject of gender stereotyping. Her seminal 1995 article, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation, took aim at gender discrimination “in favor of or against a particular gendered trait or set of traits.”258 Case’s subsequent scholarship has continued
to argue for legal protection of individuals who transgress conventional gender

252. 490 U.S. 228 255–58 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the
district court did not clearly err in finding that sex stereotyping played a part in decision to
deny the plaintiff a promotion). Ascriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer classifies
all individuals belonging to a social group on the basis of a stereotype applied monolithically
to that group. Zachary R. Herz, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 396 (2014). For example, an employer who refuses
categorically to hire women for an executive position because of a belief that women are insufficiently competitive. Prescriptive stereotyping occurs when employers expect that members of a group should exhibit specific traits. For example, an employer who demands that a
female employee look and act feminine. See id. at 398–400.
253. See Yuracko, supra note 241, at 76986.
254. Some scholars believe Price Waterhouse protects all forms of gender performance in
the workplace, even those that may be idiosyncratic or in flux. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 78081 (2002). Most courts, however, have rejected this broad interpretation. See Yuracko, supra note 241, at 77071.
255. If Title VII requires trait neutrality, then an employer may require an employee to
exhibit, or not exhibit, a particular trait but must remain indifferent to the class of persons
doing so. For example, an employer can prohibit employees from wearing dresses but must do
so with respect to female and male employees alike.
256. If Title VII requires category neutrality, then employers may enforce gender stereotypes by maintaining sex-respecting behavioral codes in the workplace but must allow individuals to select the sex with which they identify. This interpretation has facilitated the claims
of transsexual or transgendered persons who argue that an employer wrongly classified their
gender identity in demanding conformance to normative gender codes.
257. These injuries are imposed by state action in the equal-protection context or an employment decision or practice in the Title VII context.
258. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 79 n.268 (1995).
Case observed that while legal protections were building for women, as exemplified by the
Court’s Price Waterhouse decision, men who exhibited feminine gender presentation still
lacked protection. See id. at 2–3.
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norms, regardless of whether those individuals belong to particular identity groups
(such as female, male, gay, lesbian, or transgender).259 Case’s project is thus to end
differential legal treatment on the basis of sex as well as behaviors that are culturally
coded as relating to gender.260 This is a project aimed at individual freedom, as Case
herself distinguishes between the antistereotyping principle and a principle that
would oppose laws and institutions that subordinated women. 261
In keeping with the focus on individual freedom, a number of scholars focus attention on structures that regulate identity prescriptively. Kenji Yoshino’s foundational article on “covering”262 initiated a turn in legal scholarship toward examining
assimilationist bias in the workplace. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati critique the
ways in which the identity performances in the workplace that are necessary to professional success impose disproportionate costs on “outsiders.” 263 Tristin Green enriches the literature by examining the specific demands that workplace culture makes
for assimilation related to stylized displays of competence, informal socializing, and
physical and aesthetic appearances.264 Zachary Kramer observes that sex discrimination has become more individualized, targeting particular persons who cannot conform to the norms of the workplace.265 So too, Kramer argues, should the legal regime respond by protecting the myriad of individualized expressions of gender
identity.266
Antistereotyping theory reinforces neoliberal conceptions of the archetypal legal
subject, injury, and remedy. The neoliberal subject is the autonomous individual acting without constraints in the marketplace; artificial restraints on such action constitute injury; and the actor’s unfettering is an ideal remedy. By locating individual

259. Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title
VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the
Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2014).
260. See Case, supra note 72, at 1473.
261. See id. (arguing that stereotypes “are problematic when embodied in law, even in law
that does not in any articulable way subordinate women to men”). The antistereotyping project, Case argues, is not necessarily limited to formal equality, defined as limitations on facial
sex classifications. It may at times require substantive equality, defined as sex-neutral regimes
that are nonetheless responsive to particularized gender characteristics (for example, disability
related benefits that are universal yet disproportionately protect pregnant women). Id. at 1474.
Case argues, however, that antistereotyping may require remedies that depart from those required to realize antisubordination values. See id. at 1476 (arguing that separate castes, even
in the absence of subordination, would violate constitutional liberty by limiting individuals to
predetermined social roles).
262. Yoshino, supra note 254.
263. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259
(2000). These costs include deeper compromises between performed identity and authentic
conceptions of self as well as greater efforts expended to conform. See id. at 1288–90.
264. Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 644–46
(2005). Courts entrench the subordinating effects of workplace culture organized around
white-male norms by portraying culture as a business prerogative and nonconformity as a failure of responsibility or ability on the part of the nonconformist. Id. at 658–64.
265. Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891 (2014).
266. Id. at 952–53 (proposing an accommodation regime for gender expression).
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freedom as the core function of antidiscrimination law, antistereotyping similarly
frames inequality as a problem of constraint on individual agency.
The antistereotyping theory at the core of sex-discrimination law fails to challenge
the fundamental terms of workplace organization. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
labor feminists insisted that social justice would require not only individual employment opportunity but also protective laws that would make workplaces more amenable to flourishing family and civic lives. Today, feminist scholarship’s focus on sex
discrimination stresses only half of that aspiration. By recasting individual freedom
as the measure of a just labor market, antistereotyping theory may in fact legitimate
existing workplace structures. The theory therefore entrenches the power imbalances
between employers and employees that shape workers’ family lives as well as work
lives. As I discuss in Part III.B below, the limits of antistereotyping theory are especially injurious to working-class women.
2. Market Rationality and the Antidiscrimination/Accommodation Distinction
The early construction of Title VII as an efficiency-promoting statute continues
to influence scholarship. Leading casebooks use efficiency as an organizing principle
to unify disparate employment-law doctrines, and innumerable articles apply a lawand-economics analysis to the field.267 John Donohue, for example, argues that Title
VII’s normative force derives from the fact that its prohibition on disparate treatment
rewards workers for the true value of their labor.268 In this view, imperfect markets
trigger the coercive function of employment-discrimination law, and Title VII’s purpose is to perfect markets. The efficiency frame is so pervasive that it serves as the
necessary foil against which scholars must pose alternatives. 269
At the same time, it is commonplace that some of the discrimination prohibited
by Title VII may actually be efficient from the standpoint of employers. For example,
racism among customers and coworkers may make racial preferences in hiring an
efficient practice for employers.270 Nevertheless, Title VII indisputably prohibits
such practices; there is no business-necessity defense to such facially discriminatory
treatment.271 Therefore, even the disparate-treatment prong of the statute—its less

267. For a critical observation of this trend, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law
and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225 (2013).
268. John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three Concepts
of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 259195 (1994).
269. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 267 (arguing that social equality and neither economic efficiency nor the need to rectify imbalances in bargaining power should unify
employment-discrimination scholarship).
270. See Fiss, supra note 158, at 259–60; Jolls, supra note 198, at 686–87.
271. Customer and client preferences nonetheless continue to shape the workplace. While
such preferences cannot serve as a defense to facially discriminatory treatment, they may legitimate a facially neutral policy that disproportionately burdens workers in ways that trace
religious as well as ethnic differences. See Dallan F. Flake, Image Is Everything: Corporate
Branding and Religious Accommodation in the Workplace, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 72533
(2015) (gathering and analyzing cases in which courts held that requiring employers to accommodate employees’ religious practices which required departure from facially neutral appearance rules would constitute an undue hardship on the employers). But see EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 203334 (2015) (holding that failure to
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contested form of liability—may be inefficient in specific instances. In this sense,
the ideal of Title VII as market perfecting is a tenacious legal fiction.
The fiction of capitalist rationality persists, ironically, in part because of some
scholars’ efforts to defend the normative legitimacy of Title VII. As Samuel
Bagenstos explains, scholars have drawn a strategic distinction between traditional
civil rights statutes and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) by framing the former as efficient.272 The key article, Mark Kelman’s Market Discrimination
and Groups, argues that the prohibition on simple discrimination (disparate treatment) gives individuals the right to impersonal, rational treatment in a capitalist labor
market.273 By contrast, the accommodation claims recognized by the ADA impose
costs beyond those posed by Title VII’s demand for an efficient marketplace. 274
Kelman concludes, therefore, that accommodation is politically contestable in a way
that the prohibition on simple discrimination is not because it involved claims to
finite social resources.275 Kelman’s account is foundational to an intellectual genealogy that locates the normative basis for Title VII in market rationality. In solidifying
the justification for disparate-treatment liability, Kelman’s theory likewise makes
disparate-impact liability even more suspect.
Kelman’s account of Title VII reinforces a neoliberal understanding of the market
as emptied of social concerns beyond efficiency. Kelman’s definition of commercial
activity excluded thick determinants of social identity and social-power relations
among employees, customers, and employers alike. Kelman writes: “[T]he plaintiff
seeking to block simple discrimination . . . . seeks to be treated as embodied net
receipts (in her role as a customer) or embodied net marginal product (in her role as
worker.)”276 Kelman explains away the problem of the consumer-preference exception to the efficiency of disparate-treatment liability with reference to abstracted capitalist rationality. He suggests that customers are themselves duty bound to treat service workers according to dictates of impersonal capitalism. 277 Similarly, Kelman
dismisses the libertarian objection that Title VII compromised employers’ associational interests. His reasoning depicted the market as a wholly commercial realm

accommodate a religious practice that contradicts a facially neutral policy may constitute disparate treatment in violation of Title VII); Debbie Kaminer, Religious Accommodation in the
American Workplace: The Consequences of the Supreme Court’s Decision in EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, 5 J.L. RELIGION & ST. 25 (2017) (suggesting that the Abercrombie decision has moved the doctrine from formal to substantive equality of religious employees in
the workplace).
272. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 910–15 (2003).
273. Kelman, supra note 193, at 840. Kelman did not address disparate-impact liability
under Title VII in this article. By contrast, Jolls, supra note 198, at 65266, recognized that
this prong of Title VII was essentially an accommodation mandate.
274. Kelman, supra note 193, at 840–45.
275. Id. at 852–55.
276. Id. at 892.
277. Kelman asserted that customers whose discriminatory preferences (for example, for
white retail clerks or female airline stewardesses) were frustrated thereby suffered only psychic and not financial losses. See id. at 844. This conception of injury asserted that the only
“real” losses were economic ones. Id. at 844.
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isolated from personal identity and group formation. 278 Kelman thus recasts the market as unmoored from social roles and justified antidiscrimination law in purely
capitalist terms. Although Kelman is a critical theorist and not aligned with law-andeconomics scholars either methodologically or empirically, he similarly helps to construct an understanding of the labor market as driven purely by individual, rational
choice. Kelman’s theory thus helps to articulate and to solidify a neoliberal depiction
of Title VII’s function to perfect markets. This representation in turn delegitimated
claims that the terms of the market were themselves unjust.
It is perhaps the conjunction between the efficiency frame for Title VII and
neoliberalism that explains why the former is so difficult to dislodge. The framing of
employment-discrimination law in market terms is not universal and has multiple
critics. Michael Selmi writes, for example, “Most people would contend that our legal system proscribes discrimination because it is wrong[,] not because it is an inefficient business practice.”279 Robert Post likewise critiques the way in which the
dominant understanding of employment-discrimination law instrumentalizes individuals.280 By requiring that employers treat job candidates and employees in a manner “blind” to race and sex, the prevailing interpretation of Title VII strips individuals
of their full social identities and, therefore, cabins the statute’s moral import.
Professor Bagenstos argues that it is not efficiency but social equality, defined as
inclusion of groups excluded from market and civic participation, which justifies the
prohibition on discrimination.281 Nonetheless, capitalist rationality stubbornly persists as a primary justification for Title VII and thus an ideological limit on the statute’s scope. In legitimating the idea that a fully rational labor market is a just labor
market, the efficiency paradigm further cabins our legal culture’s understanding of
law’s regulatory functions.
B. “Best Practices”: The Shortcomings of Neoliberal Antidiscrimination Law for
Working-Class Women
The tropes of antistereotyping and market rationality find fruition in the trend toward managerial “best practices” as a means of Title VII implementation. The bestpractices concept responds to neoliberal workplace structures characterized by

278. Kelman thus concluded that employers and business owners purportedly making associational claims were in fact asserting the right to buttress a particular sociopolitical hierarchy. Id. at 869. But this characterization erased any social identity from the selves that entered
the realm of the market, drawing an artificial distinction between the public and private. See
Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3032 (2000).
279. Michael Selmi, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J.
1233, 1247 (1999), cited in Bagenstos, supra note 272, at 850 n.74.
280. See Post, supra note 278, at 15 (“[I]t is no small irony that American antidiscrimination law, which springs from the noble liberal impulse to protect persons from the indignities
of prejudicial mistreatment, should in the end unfold itself according to a logic that points
unmistakably toward the instrumentalization of persons.”).
281. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 267 (arguing that social equality is the underlying
principle of employment-discrimination law which justifies even meaningful costs on
employees).
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flexible work schedules, diffuse authority, and contingent employment relationships.282 It aims to enforce employment-discrimination law in this changed workplace context via managerial training and self-regulation.283 The focus is on an
institutional approach to regulating individualized interactions and biases as well as
on using employment-discrimination law as a means to better identify talent and hire
and promote meritorious workers. While best practices may promote inclusion along
identity-based axes, such practices enforce managerial authority rather than redistribute power between employers and workers. By failing to challenge the
fundamental terms of the employment relationship—including hours, wages, leave
policies, and conditions of work—even best practices to enforce Title VII fall short
of meeting the most pressing needs of working-class women.
In an influential 2001 article, Professor Susan Sturm explains that race and sex
discrimination had evolved from “first generation” to “second generation” employment discrimination.284 Discrimination no longer conforms to patterns of deliberate
and intentional exclusion from employment opportunities, job segregation, and conscious stereotyping.285 Exclusion now derives from unconscious bias, more subtle
social interaction within groups, and the cumulative effects of daily ongoing decision
making.286 In lieu of sex-segregated “want ads” in newspapers or race-segregated
seniority lines in factories, discrimination arises from complex interactions among
coworkers who, despite their lack of formal authority, may have the power to marginalize nonconforming individuals in the workplace.287 Given this transformed
workplace, it becomes harder for courts to trace discrimination to single, adverse
employment decisions made by individual actors. 288 Instead, Sturm argues “secondgeneration” discrimination stems from organizational culture. 289
Although they do not describe it in these terms, Sturm and others focus on
“second-generation discrimination” to describe what social theorists recognize as
neoliberal trends in workplace organization. 290 This workplace is one characterized
by a shift toward informal norms, flattened organizational hierarchies, and flexible
job duties and hours. Power is diffuse rather than authoritarian. The boundaries
between work and personal time collapse as work hours grow longer and more
erratic. The boundaries between work and civic life erode as identity expression
becomes increasingly valued in the workplace and one’s career emerges as a site of

282. See infra text accompanying notes 303–14.
283. See infra text accompanying notes 292–98.
284. Sturm, supra note 25, at 460.
285. Id. at 46568.
286. Id. at 46874.
287. Id. at 468.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 46869. Organizational culture involves patterns of work assignment, remarks
on some workers’ appearance or competence, socialization among coworkers, hyperscrutiny
of some workers, and underappreciation of others’ contributions. See id. at 468–69.
290. For discussion of such trends, see generally Enda Brophy & Greig de Peuter, Immaterial Labor, Precarity, and Recomposition, in KNOWLEDGE WORKERS IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 177 (Catherine McKercher & Vincent Mosco eds., 2007).
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identity. As Tristin Green shows, today’s workplaces use “strong cultures” as a form
of social control.291
In response to the changing character of discrimination within a transformed
workplace, Sturm advocated a “structural-regulatory” approach.292 Sturm argued that
courts appropriately performed the function of elaborating upon legal norms. 293 But
they were ill-suited to enforce Title VII because any rule broad enough to cover the
variety of forms of second-generation discrimination would be too ambiguous to
guide lawful conduct.294 Sturm suggested that the courts are instead assuming a new
role, in which they serve as the institutions which articulate legal norms and ultimately serve as the “backstop” for their enforcement but shy away from the elaboration of detailed rules.295 Instead of implementing clearly defined rules, Sturm argued
that vanguard employers “have instituted internal systems for preventing and remedying problems stemming from complex workplace relationships.”296 These internal
regulatory systems would ideally focus on transforming workplace structures by exposing problems, producing information that would catalyze action, establishing incentives to change behavior, and evaluating results.297 Intermediaries including lawyers, human-resource professionals, organizational consultants, and employee
groups would also help to hold employers accountable to public norms articulated
by courts.298
The EEOC takes a similar internal regulatory approach in outlining “best practices” to prevent discrimination. Such practices involve top executives’ embrace of
equal employment opportunity values, training of human-resource managers, the fostering of an inclusive culture, early dispute resolution, and objective criteria for hiring and promotion.299 Best practices are undoubtedly an important mechanism for
addressing workplace structures that reproduce gendered and racialized exclusion
and for promoting individual employment opportunity. At the same time, this trend
represents a neoliberal response to a neoliberal workplace. The best-practices model
locates the solution to inequality in employer prerogatives. The concept thereby reinforces managerial control rather than empowering workers’ collective organization
within the workplace.
Best practices cannot address the inequities that arise from the structure of work

291. Green, supra note 264, at 63537.
292. Sturm, supra note 25, at 479.
293. Id. at 463.
294. Id. at 461.
295. Id. at 479.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 48990.
298. See id. at 52223.
299. Best Practices for Employers and Human Resources/EEO Professionals, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/bestpractices
-employers.cfm [https://perma.cc/DMN5-PBJK]; see also Andrea R. Calem & Susan F.
Wiltsie, Gender Identity in the Workplace: Best Practices, HUNTON & WILLIAMS (Nov. 23,
2015), http://www.huntonlaborblog.com/2015/11/articles/employment-policies/gender-identity
-in-the-workplace-best-practices [https://perma.cc/CNG2-TNQB] (describing best practices
for management and human resource personnel regarding policies that facilitate the expression
of gender identity in the workplace).
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itself rather than gender- and race-based exclusion within those structures. The most
pressing employment-related dilemmas confronting many low-income women do
not relate to sex discrimination. They concern low wages and poor work conditions.
Working-class women face both erratic hours, which make it difficult to schedule
childcare and other nonwork responsibilities, and mandatory overtime, which makes
it hard to find time for family and leisure. They are channeled into part-time positions
without adequate health care, disability, and family-leave benefits. They are disproportionately represented in service and healthcare sectors characterized by pay below
the living wage.300 Such inequities have everything to do with the gender and race of
the persons who perform certain types of work but are not legally cognizable as discrimination.301 The metaphor that best characterizes the dilemmas that face lowincome women is not the “glass ceiling” but the “concrete floor.”302
1. Work Hours and Wages: The Limits of Internal Regulation, Antistereotyping
Theory, and FReD
The defeat of labor feminists’ campaigns for universal protective labor standards
casts a long shadow. Though popular discussion often focuses on women’s wage
gap, work hours and schedules are also pressing problems that receive less political
attention. Today, working-class women (and many men, too) endure work schedules
that make it difficult to earn sufficient income and to balance employment with family life.303 The FLSA is inadequate to protect the needs of workers in feminized occupations within the service, retail, and information sectors for stable, predictable,
and adequate work hours. Had labor feminists won voluntary-overtime laws over
forty years ago, such legislation may have laid the political foundation for the kind
of state regulation over work hours that is so desperately needed today.
The absence of state protective standards is particularly devastating to lowincome workers because of the weakening of the organized labor movement in the
late twentieth century. Unions provide a primary source of leverage for workingclass employees to negotiate for improved hours, scheduling, and leave policies. 304

300. Richard J. Torraco, The Persistence of Working Poor Families in a Changing U.S. Job
Market: An Integrative Review of the Literature, 15 HUM. RESOURCE DEV. REV. 55, 60 (2016).
301. See, e.g., BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 112, at 8 (arguing that the “racialized feminization” of home healthcare workers devalued their labor in the market).
302. Wider Opportunities for Women, an advocacy group dedicated to promoting economic security for women, uses the term “concrete floor” to describe the barriers preventing
women from entering blue-collar jobs with high wages and decent benefits. Is Laboring for
Less Women’s Work?, WIDER OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN: ECON. SECURITY BLOG (Aug. 31,
2012), http://www.wowonline.org/blog/2012/08/31/is-laboring-for-less-womens-work/ [https://
perma.cc/8EZY-RNSY]. But the problem of the “concrete floor” runs even deeper, reaching
the question of how to make “women’s jobs” good jobs.
303. See LIZ WATSON & JENNIFER E. SWANBERG, FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE SOLUTIONS FOR
LOW-WAGE HOURLY WORKERS 34 (2011), http://workplaceflexibility2010.org/images/uploads
/whatsnew/Flexible%20Workplace%20Solutions%20for%20Low-Wage%20Hourly%20Work
ers.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PE9-UMQV].
304. See, e.g., Jillian Crocker & Dan Clawson, Buying Time: Gendered Patterns in Union
Contracts, 59 SOC. PROBS. 459 (2012) (comparing negotiation regarding work hours and
schedules in the union contracts of nurses and firefighters).
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Yet the last several decades have witnessed a precipitous decline in labor’s power.
At the apex of the labor movement’s power in the 1960s, one-third of employees
were unionized; today about seven percent of private sector workers and twelve percent of public sector workers are union members.305 The labor movement’s loss of
influence over electoral politics helps to explain why activists lost momentum to
augment state and federal labor protections.306
Working-class women today endure long hours, mandatory overtime, involuntary
part-time employment, and erratic work schedules. While work hours have decreased
since the 1970s for many Americans—including those past retirement age, the
young, and middle-aged men—women have increased their work hours dramatically
over the last several decades.307 Low-wage, hourly workers, of whom nearly twothirds are women,308 bear the brunt of harmful trends in employers’ hours and scheduling practices. Up to thirty percent of low-wage workers face required overtime,
and fifty-eight percent of these workers report they would face backlash from their
employers if they refused such work. 309 While male workers typically are concerned
with access to overtime work, women workers are disproportionately concerned with
reduction in mandatory overtime work and the ability to choose whether to perform
overtime shifts.310 At the other end of the spectrum, low-wage women workers also
face involuntary part-time employment that deepens their economic insecurity. 311
More than one-quarter of these workers experience further reductions in hours and
layoffs when work is slow.312
In addition to excessively rigid work hours, low-wage workers confront unpredictable and instable work schedules. Popular discourse constructing workplace
“flexibility” as a positive good for higher-level, salaried workers has obscured the
injuries that a flexible workforce poses for low-wage workers.313 Frontline managers
face corporate pressure to reconcile consumer demand with labor supply via just-intime scheduling.314 As a result, low-wage employees face very short notice regarding
their work schedules. For these employees, the number of work hours per week and

305. NEVA GOODWIN, JONATHAN HARRIS, JULIE A. NELSON, BRIAN ROACH & MARIANO
TORRAS, MACROECONOMICS IN CONTEXT 355 (Routledge 2d ed. 2015) (2014).
306. A close examination of labor’s political decline lies beyond the scope of this Article.
For an overview, see generally LICHTENSTEIN, supra note 73, at 21245.
307. Tyler Cowen, More Time To Unwind, Unless You’re a Woman, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2016, at BU3.
308. WATSON & SWANBERG, supra note 303, at 14.
309. Id. at 6.
310. Crocker & Clawson, supra note 304, at 468–71.
311. The involuntary part-time employment rate for women rose from 3.6% to 7.8%
between 2007 and 2012. REBECCA GLAUBER, CARSEY INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 64, WANTING
MORE BUT WORKING LESS: INVOLUNTARY PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC
VULNERABILITY 1 (2013), http://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1198&context
=carsey [https://perma.cc/GJN3-KQ6D]. That year, one in four involuntary part-time workers
had incomes below the poverty line. Id.
312. WATSON & SWANBERG, supra note 303, at 6.
313. Susan J. Lambert, Passing the Buck: Labor Flexibility Practices That Transfer Risk
onto Hourly Workers, 61 HUM. REL. 1203, 1205 (2008).
314. See id. at 121213; Charlotte Alexander, Anna Haley-Lock & Nantiya Ruan, Stabilizing Low-Wage Work, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2015).
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distribution of hours across the week fluctuate constantly. 315 Corporate flexibility has
resulted in a fifty-one percent increase in the standard deviation of hourly-wages
rates since the 1970s and a twenty-three percent increase in the standard deviation of
work hours.316 Meanwhile, less than half of employers provide a majority of their
workers with family-friendly work schedules, and low-wage workers are the least
likely to benefit from such policies.317
Antidiscrimination law is impotent to address the harmful work hours and schedules experienced by low-wage workers. These are not injustices that arise from comparative discrimination but rather derive from the structure of work itself. They are
the result of economic shifts in capital, managerial strategies, and power imbalances
between employers and employees. The implementation of best practices to combat
employment discrimination does little to rectify such imbalances and may further
increase managerial power over workers.
As Valerie Vojdik argues, the antistereotyping theory limits claims under Title
VII to those of miscategorization.318 An employer would violate Title VII if he denied a job to a woman with young children on the assumption that her domestic responsibilities would preclude her from performing routine overtime work. 319 The
employee would likely win a lawsuit arguing that the employer discriminated against
her on the basis of invalid sex-role stereotypes. But antidiscrimination offers no remedy to the worker—male or female—whose caregiving responsibilities do interfere
with his or her capacity to perform routine overtime work.
For the same reason, one doctrine at the vanguard of antistereotyping theory—
that of “family responsibilities employment discrimination” (FReD)—is inherently
limited. The doctrinal innovation of FReD is that a plaintiff does not need to prove
comparator evidence to establish evidence of discrimination. 320 Evidence of sex
stereotyping, alone, can suffice to show that an employer made an adverse employment decision on the basis of sex. FReD has opened the door to hundreds of litigants
challenging the “maternal wall.”321 But it leaves intact the requirements of a job—be
that erratic hours, overtime work, lack of family leave, or the dearth of routine accommodations for caregiving. Successful FReD cases prove that the employer
wrongly presumed that an employee or job candidate would not be able to perform
the job because of her family. 322 FReD does not catalyze labor-market structures responsive to employees’ needs for predictable and limited work hours, flexible schedules, family leave, higher wages, and healthcare benefits.
The emphasis on antidiscrimination within legal culture, moreover, legitimates

315. See WATSON & SWANBERG, supra note 303, at 4; Lambert, supra note 313, at 1204.
316. Lambert, supra note 313, at 1205.
317. WATSON & SWANBERG, supra note 303, at 34.
318. Valorie K. Vojdik, Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the
Exclusion of Women from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REV. 303, 34749 (2005).
319. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias,
59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1312–13 (2008) (discussing Gallina v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., 123 F. App’x 558 (4th Cir. 2005)).
320. See id. at 1352.
321. Id. at 1315, 1336.
322. Id. at 135253.
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existing workplace structures. Antidiscrimination doctrine frames the just labor market as one that fully includes various social identities, rather than as one that gives
low-wage employees more control over their work lives. Antistereotyping theory, in
particular, obscures the need for state protection of workers in its focus on unlawful
assumptions about an individual’s capacity to comply with institutional productivity
norms. The concern with ending sex-role stereotyping implies that if we could eliminate artificial sex segregation and catalyze individual freedom we would have realized an egalitarian labor market. Antistereotyping theory reinforces workplace norms
and challenges neither the terms of work nor the gendered division between productive and reproductive labor.323
2. Family Leave and Pregnancy Accommodation: The Limits of Disparate
Treatment and Disparate-Impact Liability
While antidiscrimination law may never reach structural issues such as work
hours, robust interpretations of disparate-impact liability did once have the capacity
to prompt workplace transformations accommodating pregnant and caregiving workers. Title VII jurisprudence today, however, limits the redistributive interpretations
of the statute. The continued influence of neoliberal thought on antidiscrimination
doctrine only further highlights the need for substantive, rather than comparative,
rights to pregnancy accommodation and family leave.
The narrow interpretation of Title VII is particularly harmful to low-wage female
workers who disproportionately lack access to family-leave and pregnancy accommodations. Approximately forty percent of the American workforce is comprised of
contingent and precarious laborers, whose nonstandard jobs fail to provide paid sick
days, vacation, and family leave.324 Family-leave laws have limited benefits for lowincome workers, as demonstrated by extensive scholarship in law and social sciences.325 The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) covers only those employees
who worked at least 1250 hours in the past year, 326 for employers that employed at
least fifty workers per year.327 As a result, the statute excludes about forty percent of
American workers; low-wage female workers are disproportionately excluded.328

323. My claim is not that employment-discrimination law and scholarship is itself unnecessary or harmful. Rather, the disproportionate focus on antidiscrimination law in feminist
legal theory and in broader discourse about work-family conflict occludes the issues most
salient to working-class women. The disproportionate attention to antidiscrimination theory
thereby legitimates the structural terms of the employment relationship that contribute to economic inequality.
324. Catherine Albiston & Lindsey Trimble O’Connor, Just Leave, 39 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 1, 1 (2016).
325. See, e.g., id.; O’Leary, supra note 231, at 45–47 (describing early efforts to provide
paid leave to low-income workers).
326. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
327. § 2611(4)(A)(i).
328. O’Leary, supra note 231, at 43–44, 43 n.224; Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix
for the FMLA: A New Perspective, A New Solution, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 327, 339 &
n.88 (2014).
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Scholars have long launched the critique that low-income women cannot afford unpaid leave under the FMLA.329 A recent study of California’s paid family-leave law
shows that retaliatory behavior by employers prevents low-income workers from taking even paid leave.330 Meanwhile, courts’ hostility to gender-based disparate-impact
claims challenging leave policies limits the capacity for Title VII to catalyze employers’ provision of more robust benefits.
Even recent feminist victories in Title VII litigation highlight the inadequacy of
employment discrimination absent labor protections. In the 2015 case of Young v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the failure to assign a pregnant employee to light duty so as to accommodate her partial incapacity to work
could constitute discrimination in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978.331 A plaintiff could show that her employer’s proffered rationale for the nonaccommodation was a pretext for discrimination. She could do so by producing evidence that the employer’s exclusion of pregnant workers from light-duty assignments
available to other employees imposed a significant burden on pregnant women. 332

329. See, e.g., Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
1, 3 (2005) (noting that the requirement to forego wages is the most significant barrier that
prevents workers from taking leave formally available to them and that many workers who
lack paid leave must resort to public assistance).
330. See Albiston & O’Connor, supra note 324, at 50–51.
331. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). Peggy Young worked for UPS as an early morning delivery
driver. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013). When she became pregnant, Young asked for an accommodation consistent with her doctor’s recommendation of a twenty-pound lifting restriction. Id. UPS denied her request. Id. UPS, however,
extended light-duty accommodations to three other classes of workers: those injured on the
job, those with a permanent disability cognizable under the ADA, and those who have lost
certification by the Department of Transportation. Id. at 441. The central issue in the case was
how to interpret the relationship between the first clause of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
which includes pregnancy within the definition of “sex” under Title VII, and the second clause
requiring “same” treatment of pregnant workers “as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work.” Id. at 447 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). The
Supreme Court rejected both the narrow interpretation of the second clause advanced by UPS,
which would have rendered it superfluous to the statutory scheme, and the broad interpretation
advanced by Young, which would have required employers to accommodate pregnant women
any time they provided such accommodations to other workers. 135 S. Ct. at 134953. Instead,
the Court held that a plaintiff could prove that the failure to accommodate constituted discriminatory intent. Id. at 135354.
332. 135 S. Ct. at 1354. The majority held that a plaintiff could prove, using indirect evidence with the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, that the failure to accommodate constituted pregnancy discrimination. Id. at 1353–54. The plaintiff could show that the
employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for failing to accommodate was a pretext
for discrimination. Id. at 1354. Plaintiffs could create a genuine issue of material fact on this
issue by showing that the employer’s policy had a significant burden on pregnant women. Id.
The plaintiff, moreover, could show this burden via evidence that the employer accommodated
a larger percentage of non-pregnant employees than pregnant employees requiring light-duty.
Id. at 135455. For further discussion and critique of the doctrinal standards in Young, see
William R. Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc: McDonnell Douglas to the Rescue?,
92 WASH U. L. REV. 1683 (2015) (arguing that the Young case revived the outdated McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework that should have been replaced by the mixed-motive
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Young was heralded as a victory for working women;333 and there is good reason for this.
Yet the impact of Young for working-class women may be more limited than it
appears. This is because for the lack of accommodation to constitute intentional discrimination, the employer must offer light-duty accommodations to some other
group of nonpregnant workers. The only reason the Supreme Court could suggest the
possibility of discriminatory intent in Young is because unionized UPS workers had
bargained, in the first instance, for accommodation of workers injured on the job. 334
Most private-sector workers do not have this kind of bargaining strength. Employers
of low-income, nonunionized women are disproportionately likely not to offer lightduty accommodations.335 Without a baseline of accommodations realized via collective bargaining or statutory regulation, the disparate-treatment prong of Title VII will
not offer a remedy to pregnant workers who require accommodations to perform their
job duties.336
The Young litigation can thus be added to a growing line of cases that illustrate
judicial skepticism of disparate-impact liability. The tension between disparate treatment and disparate impact—often described as a contest between individual fairness
or equality of achievement under law—is also a debate about the extent to which
market values should permeate employment-discrimination law. The persistent resistance to disparate-impact liability represents opposition to redistribution not only
from whites to racial minorities, or men to women, but also from employers to workers. Scholars have recently argued that disparate-impact liability imposes unfair costs
on employers because it invalidates employment practices—such as testing—correlated with worker productivity. 337 In this light, the late Supreme Court Justice

standard set forth in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S 90 (2003)).
333. See, e.g., Paul Gordon, Peggy Young Will Get Her Day in Court, PEOPLE FOR THE
AM. WAY (Mar. 26, 2015), http://blog.pfaw.org/content/peggy-young-will-get-her-day-court
[https://perma.cc/3YSA-S227]; Tom Spiggle, Why Young v. UPS Is a Big Win for Pregnant
Workers, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27. 2015, 1:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom
-spiggle/why-young-v-ups-is-a-big_b_6956498.html [https://perma.cc/5ZK7-NUL2].
334. Memorandum Opinion at 5, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586
(D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011), 2011 WL 665321, at *2.
335. On low-wage workers’ lack of pregnancy-related benefits, see O’Leary, supra note
231, at 35; Brigid Schulte, New Statistics: Pregnancy Discrimination Claims Hit Low-Wage
Workers Hardest, WASH. POST: SHE THE PEOPLE (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/08/05/new-statistics-pregnancy-discrimination-claims-hit
-low-wage-workers-hardest/ [https://perma.cc/HG3U-A4MA].
336. Scholarly criticism of Young has missed this point about the relevance of unions to
the factual basis for the case and has instead focused on the doctrinal consequences of the case
and its implications for antistereotyping ideals. See generally Bradley A. Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125 (2016) (arguing that pregnancy specific accommodations have expressive harms that may reinforce stigma and discrimination); Corbett, supra
note 332 (critiquing the resurrection of the McDonnell Douglas framework in Young); L.
Camille Hébert, Disparate Impact and Pregnancy: Title VII’s Other Accommodation
Requirement, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 107 (2015) (arguing that a disparateimpact theory of pregnancy-related accommodation would do more than a disparate-treatment
theory to help women reconcile work and family).
337. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1191–92
(1999) (discussing employment tests which may also have a risk of disparate-impact liability).
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Antonin Scalia’s famous suggestion that disparate-impact liability may be unconstitutional because it requires employers to engage in disparate treatment takes
on a new cast.338 Most have understood Scalia’s comment as an expression of
hostility to antidiscrimination law that requires violation of a commitment to raceand sex-blind treatment.339 But it also manifests a neoliberal impulse to limit the
extent that Title VII imposes any legal mandates inconsistent with market logic.
C. Toward a Feminist Theory of Class
Popular commentators and some legal scholars have begun to emphasize the importance of taking account of class in crafting strategies to remediate work-family
conflict.340 This Article has gone further to argue that the ascent of antidiscrimination
doctrine as a central paradigm for justice in the labor market has facilitated the
neoliberal restructuring of the labor market. Yet scholars’ failure to recognize the
historical intersections between antidiscrimination law and neoliberalism has created
blind spots in contemporary visions of sex equality. Despite attention to intersectionality, feminist legal theory has paid insufficient attention to class.341 This Article uses
history to center the dilemmas that class poses for feminist legal theory.
What would it mean to understand sex equality and the potential and limitations
of sex-discrimination law from the perspective of working-class women?342 It would
require scholars to expand their historical narrative to include labor feminists such
as Myra Wolfgang, Caroline Davis, and Union WAGE members. 343 It would require

338. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting
that disparate-impact liability and equal protection are at “war”).
339. See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341,
1363 (2010) (describing a “general reading” of the Ricci decision that would lead to the constitutional invalidity of disparate-impact liability because the latter would violate the principle
of colorblindness understood in this reading “as the guiding value of equal protection”).
340. See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE 15186 (2010)
(arguing that a culture gap along class lines obscures solutions to work-family conflict); Judith
Shulevitz, How To Fix Feminism, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/06/12/opinion/sunday/how-to-fix-feminism.html (arguing for “caregiverism” involving
greater state support for caregivers) [https://perma.cc/E6YW-DADD].
341. But see Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (2016) (arguing that recent Court decisions have deepened the class-based
subordination of women); Martha T. McCluskey. Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 785 (2003) (arguing that
identity-based conceptions of social equity “favors the interests of the most privileged members of society”); O’Leary, supra note 231 (assessing the class-based limitations of the federal
FMLA and analogous state laws).
342. I do not recommend, here, that we should apply differential legal regimes
—antistereotyping and labor protection—to different classes. Rather, I am suggesting that if
forced by the constraints of the legal and political landscape to choose between sex
discrimination and labor protection, feminists should take responsibility for the class-based
consequences of strategic decision making. Such responsibility would not negate the important
project of highlighting the way in which antifeminist opposition has narrowed the possibilities
for legal and political action.
343. I am suggesting that we might recover lost strands of legal and political history to
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recasting the end of maternalist labor laws in a more nuanced light—one that would
reveal the tragic defeat of universal overtime laws and other protective state labor
standards as well as victories against sex-role stereotyping. It would require scholars
to interrogate legal and political discourses that conflate the advantages of Title VII
for professional and skilled women with its benefits for all women. It would require
confronting the limitations of antidiscrimination law to achieve the kinds of social
and economic protections that working-class women, in particular, need and lack.344
By historicizing the development of sex-discrimination law in a neoliberal context, I do not intend to advocate a return to gender stereotypes. My argument thus
departs from that of scholars, such as Julie Suk, who have questioned whether gender
stereotypes are indeed bad for women. 345 To recognize the limits of antistereotyping
theory does not necessarily involve a claim for a legal regime based on gender stereotypes. Rather, it invites us to recall that employers have used antistereotyping theory
to advance a deregulatory agenda and to oppose the realization of labor protections.
It invites us to recover a feminist vision that fused civil rights era commitments to
antistereotyping with Progressive Era and New Deal commitments to labor
protection.
Skeptics might argue that the critique of Title VII in this Article is inapposite to a
theory of sex equality as opposed to class equity. Certainly, Title VII was limited by
design in its capacity to advance economic justice along class lines. The purpose of
the statute was not to regulate the balance of power between labor and capital. Yet
this Article recovers labor feminists’ view that equality for working-class women
required both equal opportunity and labor regulation. Without a redistribution of
power between employers and employees, working-class women and men will not
be able to realize the kind of workplace supports they need for lives outside of work.

mobilize them against teleological conceptions of sex equality. For an analysis of feminist
temporal politics, see Victoria Browne, Backlash, Repetition, Untimeliness: The Temporal
Dynamics of Feminist Politics, 28 HYPATIA 905 (2013), which argues that feminists can find
in repeated conflicts within women’s history lost legacies that can inspire contemporary
resistance.
344. In suggesting the limitations of Title VII for working-class women, I do not intend to
argue that only these women require labor and social protections. Rather, all women and men
require workplace accommodations, stable and predictable hours, shorter workweeks, and
paid leave to participate effectively in care within their families and communities. But
working-class women are positioned in the labor market such that they disproportionately lack
such supports. The United States provides the kinds of protections listed above via the workplace, as a matter of employer discretion, rather than via the state, as a matter of entitlement.
The inability for antidiscrimination law to realize labor protections has particularly harmful
consequences for low-wage workers because of the terms of their employment.
345. Suk argues that maternalistic legal regimes in Western Europe do a better job helping
women to reconcile careers with family life than does the antidiscrimination regime in the
United States. Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49–51, 60–63 (2010). Suk
suggests a counterfactual: were Congress to untie maternity leave from sick-leave entitlements
then employers and business groups might tolerate more expansive entitlements for women
such as paid maternity and family leave. Id. at 21–24. Reasoning from this historical and comparative context, Suk argues for a relaxation on prohibition of stereotyping to allow legislation
targeting women’s “special” relationship with their children. Id. at 6063, 6869.
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The notion that economic justice for workers is distinct from issues of sex equality
is itself an historical artifact—a product of the way in which legal meaning was constructed over time.
This Article, therefore, contributes to scholarship that seeks to dismantle the divides between labor and employment-discrimination law.346 These exist as largely
distinct academic fields, with independent bodies of scholarship. The doctrines associated with each field are also taught in distinct courses, with employment discrimination occupying more pride of place in most law-school curriculums than labor law.
The institutional and scholarly divides between labor and employmentdiscrimination law, however, contribute to a lack of scholarly engagement with class
as a central dimension of gender justice. The construction of sex equality as a problem of discrimination—in ways that privilege antistereotyping, efficiency, and judicially enforced negative rights—legitimates class-based inequities experienced by
women and men in feminized occupations. A more capacious understanding of sex
equality—rooted in collective security, workers’ organizing rights, and positive welfare entitlements—necessitates fundamental changes in the labor market, economy,
and social policy. To help illuminate the path to this change, legal scholars need to
produce scholarship and teach courses that integrate antidiscrimination law with labor and social-welfare law.
CONCLUSION: LOOKING BACKWARD TO MOVE FORWARD
This Article argues that in the late twentieth century employment-discrimination
law intertwined with neoliberalism on ideological, institutional, and doctrinal levels.
Title VII shares with neoliberalism fundamental ideals including individual freedom,
negative rights, and efficiency. That convergence did not determine whether
neoliberalism would serve neoliberal purposes, but it created the historical possibility
for actors to use Title VII in ways that stripped equality of its redistributive content.
Employers and state politicians used litigation under Title VII to undermine protective labor standards. Courts foreclosed plaintiffs’ claims that might have transformed
employment structures to make them more supportive of social life outside of the
workplace. Our nation might have realized the vision of labor feminists who advocated workers’ rights to state protection as well as to equal employment opportunity.

346. Labor-law scholars have initiated this inquiry by exploring the role of employmentdiscrimination statutes in worker organizing. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 390–94 (2005) (arguing
that the threat of employment-law damages can pressure firms into recognizing collective selfgovernance by workers); Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 208–212 (2007) (arguing that unions
“strategic[ally]” deploy employment law to generate negative publicity for firms and positive
displays of union power that can induce employers, for example, to agree to card-check recognition procedures); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
2685, 272234 (2008) (arguing that FLSA and Title VII can galvanize worker organizing by
framing a common grievance and prompting a collective identity as well as insulate their collective action from employer interference through retaliation provisions).
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Instead, U.S. legal culture largely forgot a vision of equality premised upon collective needs, positive rights, and a more equitable distribution of responsibility for social reproduction between the state, market, and family.
The Article’s historical argument offers important insight into the limits of antidiscrimination theory today. Antistereotyping doctrine challenges misconceptions
about who is able to perform job duties. But it poses no challenge to employment
structures including work hours, leave policies, and benefits. The theory promotes
individual freedom of gender expression in the workplace, but does not redress
power imbalances between employers and employees. In addition, efficiency remains a leading interpretive frame in employment-discrimination law. Its dominance
contributes to judicial hostility to disparate-impact claims that challenge the definition of workplace productivity and the terms of the employment relationship. These
limitations of antidiscrimination jurisprudence disproportionately burden lowincome women. Antidiscrimination law fails to address the problems of low wages,
long and erratic hours, and dangerous workplaces.
The Article calls for a redirection of scholarly resources beyond best practices in
employment-discrimination law toward theories that address the structures of the labor market and the employment relationship. There are struggles yet to be fought on
the frontiers of antidiscrimination, but it may also be time to realize the incapacity
for even these aspirational forms of law to realize a just workplace for low-income
workers. Indeed, the focus on antidiscrimination as the core meaning of equality may
legitimate class-based inequities. Taking significant steps toward a more just labor
market for working-class women and men may require shifting the loci of our scholarly energies.
This Article’s insights open up important new lines of inquiry in several fields.
Understanding the relationship between antidiscrimination and free-market ideals
enriches the history of American liberalism. Scholars might research further the ideological and institutional connections among individual freedom, state neutrality,
and efficiency. To take just one discrete example: In 1922, the journalist and political
commentator Walter Lippmann introduced the concept of the stereotype into
American popular thought.347 Fifteen years later, Lippmann wrote the first political
treatise in English to argue for the superiority of the free-market system.348
Lipmann’s dual interests could not have been coincidental. There is not yet a comprehensive history of the concept of the stereotype. Such a study would deepen our
understanding of why employment-discrimination law was susceptible to neoliberal
appropriation in the late twentieth century.
Exposing the imbrication of Title VII and neoliberalism is not only a task for
historians, however. This Article shows why it is an urgent project for legal theorists.

347. See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 79–94 (1922) (defining a stereotype as a social norm that constrains individual decisions and life choices); see also Bernstein, supra note
14, at 658.
348. See WALTER LIPPMANN, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD SOCIETY
(1937) (arguing that free markets promote social trust and cooperation among individuals);
see also Dieter Plehwe, Introduction to THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE
NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 13 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., paperback ed.
with new preface 2015).
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Title VII presupposes a definition of equality rooted in market participation. Accordingly, the statute may be inherently linked to neoliberalism. Building upon this insight, feminist scholars might further excavate why Title VII cannot realize substantive conceptions of gender equality. 349 Employment-discrimination law reinforces a
division between productive labor in the market and reproductive labor in the
home.350 It can help to redistribute familial and market functions between the sexes—
enabling women to act as breadwinners and men to act as caregivers—but it does not
revalue the caregiving role itself. By defining equality in terms of labor-market participation, employment-discrimination law may reinforce the legitimacy of
neoliberal policies that make social reproduction a private responsibility. 351 This has
disproportionate effects on women and men who perform caregiving via unpaid labor
for their families as well as low-paid labor in the market.352 Feminist scholars need
to look beyond antidiscrimination theory to meet the needs of low-income workers
whose work lives conflict with their family lives. 353 If we fail to recognize how

349. Critical race theorists and disability scholars, too, have an essential role to play in
reaching beyond “best practices.” African Americans and civil rights advocates have in the
past advocated class-based remedies for the economic subordination experienced by racial
minorities; this historical example provides a foundation for contemporary theories of racial
justice not limited to antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE
OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007) (arguing that a Thirteenth Amendment litigation strategy combatting
Jim Crow as a system of economic exploitation held greater potential to help poor African
Americans than the Fourteenth Amendment litigation challenging racial segregation);
JONATHAN SCOTT HOLLOWAY, CONFRONTING THE VEIL (2002) (examining African American
thinkers who approached racial problems via a class analysis). In establishing rights to accommodation, disability law poses an explicit challenge to efficiency ideals in antidiscrimination
theory. See Bagenstos, supra note 272. Legal scholars have called for more expansive forms
of accommodation. See Widiss, supra note 206, at 1025–34 (arguing that employers have a
duty under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to extend to pregnant workers the same accommodations offered to employees with disabilities cognizable under the ADA). But the scholarship can take the insight of disability theory further to call for a severance of the very concept
of just employment from market logic.
350. Employment-discrimination law enables women to occupy the role of breadwinner as
well as caregiver. But it maintains the fundamental division between market work and unremunerated care work. The ongoing division, itself, perpetuates injustice even if men and
women participated in the labor market to an equal degree.
351. For further discussion of how neoliberalism reinforces a public/private divide, see
DUGGAN, supra note 140, at 1315.
352. The low value placed on care contributes to the lack of public support for familial
caregiving and to the low wages paid market-based caregivers such as home health care and
childcare workers. See generally MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE (2010) (arguing
that caretaking should join liberty and equality as standard goods promoted by liberalism and
that the state should support the family in its caretaking role); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004) (arguing for collective, public responsibility for the inevitable
dependency that arises from human biology and development as well as the derivative dependency of caregivers); NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART (2001) (arguing that the nonpayment and underpayment of caregiving means that women absorb the costs of our capitalist
economy).
353. Employment-discrimination law does not itself transform low-wage, feminized jobs
to make the wages more adequate to support a family, the hours more amenable to family life,
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employment-discrimination law may reinforce neoliberal cutbacks in labor protection and welfare entitlements, then we risk exacerbating economic inequalities.
Last, this Article invites scholars to reconsider the meaning of both antidiscrimination and neoliberalism. The Article has revealed an underside of employmentdiscrimination theory that entrenches class-related privilege and disadvantages. As
institutionalized in a neoliberal context, there is less to celebrate about Title VII than
we have thought. Conversely, however, there also may be less to lament about
neoliberalism. If neoliberalism includes a commitment to the elimination of status
hierarchies and the unraveling of race and gender stereotypes, can neoliberalism be
all bad? Recognizing the intersection of ideas about individual freedom in both antidiscrimination and neoliberal theory calls for a richer, less ideologically inflected
understanding of neoliberalism. Perhaps, in the end, we are all neoliberals, now. 354

or the conditions safer.
354. If so, then it would suggest a historical evolution in legal theory from the moment in
the late twentieth century when scholars realized that they were “all legal realists now.” See,
e.g., Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 19271960 (1986)).

